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ABSTRACT 
As a key tenet of distributed maritime operations (DMO), available manned and 
unmanned, surface and air, combatants and sensors require integration to serve as a 
cohesive, networked force despite their distribution through physical space-time. This 
research project seeks to understand how to enable cohesive combatant-sensor integration 
for DMO and to model and outline the kinds of system capabilities and behaviors 
necessary for their integrated implementation. Planned as a multiyear project, the first 
effort described in this report focuses on establishing a computational environment 
suitable for DMO modeling, simulation and analysis, with a particular focus on both 
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A. AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
The US Department of Defense (DoD), along with the militaries of NATO 
members and other allied nations, has discovered and begun to capitalize upon the value 
of robots, unmanned vehicles and other autonomous systems (AS) for a variety of 
different missions, ranging from search and rescue, through aerial bombing, to 
Cyberspace surveillance. To a large extent, people in such military organizations operate 
and control the AS, much the same way that people in many factories operate and control 
machines for production, assembly and packaging. The AS are basically slaves to their 
human operators. 
The technologic capabilities of AS continue to accelerate, however, and systems 
in some domains have reached the technical point of total autonomy: they can perform 
entire missions without human intervention or control. For instance, in 2001 a Global 
Hawk flew autonomously on a non-stop mission from California to Australia, making 
history by being the first pilotless aircraft to cross the Pacific Ocean (AMoD, 2001). As 
another instance, in 2013 a Northrop Grumman X-47B unmanned combat air vehicle 
successfully took off from and landed on an aircraft carrier underway at sea (BBC, 2013). 
Further, as technologic sophistication continues to advance rapidly (e.g., in 
computational processing, collective sense making, intelligent decision making), a wide 
array of diverse robots (e.g., in hospitals; see Feil-Seifer & Mataric, 2005), unmanned 
vehicles (e.g., for highway driving; see Muller, 2012) and other intelligent systems (e.g., 
for industrial control; see McFarlane et al., 2003) continue to demonstrate unprecedented 
capabilities for extended, independent and even collective decision making and action 
(e.g., offensive and defensive swarming; see Bamberger et al., 2006). Indeed, the 
technologic maturity of many AS available today (e.g., UCLASS – Unmanned Carrier-
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike; see Dolgin et al., 1999) exceed the authority 
delegated to them by organizations and leaders; that is, their performance is limited more 
by policy than technology (e.g., see DoDD 3000.09, 2012). 
In many skilled mission domains and under demanding environmental conditions 
(e.g., tactical surveillance; see Joyce, 2013), AS are replacing people at an increasing rate 
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(e.g., unmanned vs. manned aircraft sorties; see Couts, 2012). These machines can 
outperform their human counterparts along many dimensions (e.g., consistency, memory, 
processing power, endurance; see Condon et al., 2013), yet they fall short in other ways 
(e.g., adaptability, innovation, judgment, ethics; see HRW, 2012). Task performance by 
AS is optimal in some situations, and performance by people is best in others, but in 
either case, the respective capabilities of autonomous machines and people remain 
complementary. As such, integrated performance, by complementary autonomous 
systems and people working together, can be superior in an increasing number of 
circumstances, including those requiring skillful collective action (Nissen & Place, 2013). 
Hence there is more to this trend than simple technologic automation of skilled 
work by machines (e.g., numeric control machining) or employment of computer tools by 
skilled people (e.g., computer aided drafting). Where autonomous systems and people 
collaborate together in coherent teams and organizations, we refer to this increasingly 
important phenomenon as Teams of Autonomous Systems and People (TASP). 
Such collaboration between autonomous systems and people represents an 
important element of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). Available manned and 
unmanned, surface and air, combatants and sensors require integration to serve as a 
cohesive, networked force despite their distribution through physical space-time. DMO 
represents a considerable technical challenge, but this kind of cohesive combatant-sensor 
integration is distributed organizationally as well. Hence DMO represents a considerable 
command and control (C2) challenge also, as a variety of different platforms (e.g., CVN, 
DDG, LCS), services (e.g., Navy, Marines, Air Force) and even nations (e.g., coalition 
operations) are likely to assert simultaneous control over the diverse combatants and 
sensors. 
 
B. OPEN DMO QUESTIONS 
In 2017, the Navy Warfare Development Command created the term Distributed 
Maritime Operations, which looks at distributed forces in a broad, Fleet-centric manner. 
The key goal is to allow commanders a greater diversity of options or combinations of 
sensors, platforms and weapons, along with both decision and execution speed, to 
outpace and defeat adversaries. DMO takes into account the merging of resources, 
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information and technologies with key decision makers at all levels of an organization. 
Indeed, DMO views warfare a distributed network that has the integration capability of 
all available platforms across all operational domains (Winstead et al., 2018). 
DMO raises a plethora of open, research, policy and decision making questions. 
For one, under what circumstances should people work subordinate to AS (e.g., robot 
supervisor) versus controlling them (e.g., robot subordinate)? Few researchers, policy 
makers or organization leaders are even asking this question today, much less trying to 
answer it, as the conventional, conservative and often naïve bias is overwhelmingly 
toward people controlling machines. Nonetheless, empiric evidence shows that AS can 
produce superior results—in some circumstances—when people are subordinate (e.g., see 
Bourne, 2013). This represents revolutionary change, and our millennia of accumulated 
knowledge in terms of C2, organization, management, leadership, information science, 
computer science, human-systems integration and like domains leaves us largely 
unprepared to seize upon such situated performance superiority. 
For another, under what circumstances should units comprised of people be 
organized, led and managed separately from counterparts comprised of AS (e.g., separate 
aircraft squadrons), and what circumstances favor instead organization integration1 of 
people and AS into combined units (e.g., integrated or composite squadrons; see CFFC, 
2014)? Because every mission-environment context manifests some uniqueness, the 
answer may vary across diverse missions, environments, times and organizations; even 
individual personnel skills, team trust levels, leadership characteristics, political risk 
aversion, and like factors may affect the approach leading to greatest mission efficacy. 
Indeed, a central aspect of mission planning and execution may require explicit 
consideration of how people and AS should be organized, how cohesive combatant-
sensor integration can be achieved, and such DMO organization may even require 
dynamic replanning and change mid-mission. 
 
1 For instance, HSM-35, located at NAS North Island, has been organized and configured to manage and 
support both the Fire Scout UAS and the H-60 aircraft (e.g., integrated technicians and operators have been 
trained to maintain and operate both systems). Additional information and guidance is available in the 
USFF/CNAF UAS Concept of Operations. Nonetheless, several questions remain: Is such integration a 
good idea? On what science is it based? What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages? How 
could it become even more effective? 
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For a third, how can researchers, policy makers and leaders develop confidence 
that their chosen DMO organization approach (e.g., to subordinating or superordinating 
robots to people, to separating or integrating AS and personnel units, to selecting 
missions involving collaboration between people and AS, to cohesive combatant-sensor 
integration) will be superior? These technology-induced research questions are so new 
and foreign that negligible theory is available for guidance, and it is prohibitively time-
consuming, expensive and error-prone to systematically test the myriad different 
approaches via operational organizations. This is the case in particular where loss of life, 
limb or liberty may be at stake.  
This leads to three primary research questions:  
RQ1: What technologic trajectories of manned and unmanned systems are most relevant 
to DMO over the coming decade? 
RQ2: What kinds of DMO approaches, organizations and technologies are most 
appropriate to leverage such technologic trajectories? 
RQ3: What kinds of decisions, specifications and training modifications are needed to 
guide DMO over the next ten years? 
 
C. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION 
Computational experimentation offers an unmatched yet largely unexplored 
potential to address DMO questions along these lines. If computational models can be 
developed to represent the most important aspects of organizations with existing, planned 
or possible DMO benefits, then researchers could employ such models to address the 
kinds of open questions posed above. Moreover, organization leaders, managers and 
policy makers could develop confidence in their situated decisions and actions involving 
the organization, integration and leadership of AS and people. 
Further, once such computational models have been developed and validated, they 
can become virtual prototype DMO organizations to be examined empirically and under 
controlled conditions through efficient computational experiments (e.g., see Oh et al., 
2009). Indeed, tens, hundreds, even thousands of diverse approaches to DMO can be 
examined very quickly, with their relative behavior and performance characteristics 
compared to match the best DMO approach with a variety of different missions, 
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environmental conditions, technologic capabilities, autonomy policies, personnel 
characteristics, skill levels and job types. Moreover, such computational experimentation 
and comparison can be accomplished very quickly and at extremely low cost relative to 
that required to experiment with teams or organizations in the laboratory—or especially 
in the field—with no risk of losing life, equipment or territory in the process (e.g., see 
Nissen & Buettner, 2004). 
The central problem is, this kind of DMO organization experimentation capability 
has yet to be developed and demonstrated. Notwithstanding current, lower level work 
addressing fatigue and like issues affecting individual unmanned system operators (e.g., 
see Yang et al., 2012), the higher level DMO experimentation capability envisioned here 
remains absent. 
 
D. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This is where our research project seeks to make an important contribution. 
Building upon a half century of research and practice in modeling and simulation in 
general (e.g., see Forrester, 1961; Law & Kelton, 1991), and a quarter century of 
organization modeling and simulation work in particular (e.g., see Carley & Prietula, 
1994), we have access to computational modeling and simulation technology 
representing the current state of the art (i.e., VDT [Virtual Design Team]; see Levitt et 
al., 1999). Such technology leverages well-understood organization micro theories and 
behaviors that emerge through agent-based interaction (e.g., see Jin & Levitt, 1996). 
Agent-based organization models developed through this technology have also 
been validated dozens of times, over a period of roughly three decades, to represent 
faithfully the structure, behavior and performance of counterpart real-world organizations 
(e.g., see Levitt, 2004). Plus, we have adapted the same computational modeling and 
simulation technology over several years to the military domain (e.g., see Nissen, 2007) 
to examine joint task forces, distributed operations, computer network operations, and 
other missions that reflect increasingly common joint and coalition endeavors. 
The research project described in this report seeks to leverage computational 
modeling to understand how to enable cohesive combatant-sensor integration for DMO 
and to model and outline the kinds of system capabilities and behaviors necessary for 
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their integrated implementation. Planned as a multiyear project, the first effort described 
in this report focuses on establishing a computational environment suitable for DMO 
modeling, simulation and analysis. In this first effort, we model, simulate and analyze 
maritime operations as they are conducted today, with a particular focus on both manned 
and unmanned aircraft intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. This 
establishes a baseline for comparison with one or more DMO organizations conducting 
ISR missions. It also establishes a baseline for comparison with other missions (e.g., 
strike, air defense, surface warfare). The second stage then proceeds to model, simulate 
and analyze one or more, alternate DMO organizations. 
In the balance of this technical report, we first provide an overview of the POWer 
computational experimentation environment along with an example to help delineate 
computational modeling of DMO organizations and phenomena. We summarize in turn 
the research method. Key results follow, and we conclude then by summarizing our 
agenda for continued research along these lines. The results should increase greatly our 
understanding and ability to enable cohesive combatant-sensor integration for DMO and 
to model and outline the kinds of system capabilities and behaviors necessary for their 
integrated implementation.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. POWER COMPUTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
This section draws heavily from Gateau and colleagues (2007) to provide an 
overview of the POWer computational environment. POWer builds upon the planned 
accumulation of collaborative research over roughly three decades to develop rich, 
theory-based models of organization processes (Levitt, 2004). Using an agent-based 
representation (Cohen, 1992; Kunz et al., 1999), micro-level organization behaviors have 
been researched and formalized to reflect well-accepted organization theory (Levitt et al., 
1999). Extensive empiric validation projects (e.g., Christiansen, 1993; Thomsen, 1998) 
have demonstrated the representational fidelity and shown how the qualitative and 
quantitative behaviors of our computational models correspond closely with a diversity of 
enterprise processes in practice. 
This research stream continues today with the goal of developing new micro-
organization theory and embedding it in software tools that can be used to design 
organizations in the same way that engineers design bridges, semiconductors or 
airplanes—through computational modeling, analysis and evaluation of multiple virtual 
prototypes. Such virtual prototypes also enable us to take great strides beyond relying 
upon the kinds of informal and ambiguous, natural-language descriptions that comprise 
the bulk of organization theory and Navy doctrine today. 
For instance, in addition to providing textual description, organization theory is 
imbued with a rich, time-tested collection of micro-theories that lend themselves to 
computational representation and analysis. Examples include Galbraith's (1977) 
information processing abstraction, March and Simon’s (1958) bounded rationality 
assumption, and Thompson’s (1967) task interdependence contingencies. Drawing on 
such micro-theory, we employ symbolic (i.e., non-numeric) representation and reasoning 
techniques from established research on artificial intelligence to develop computational 
models of theoretical phenomena. Once formalized through a computational model, the 
symbolic representation is “executable,” meaning it can be used to emulate organization 
dynamics. 
 8 
Even though the representation has qualitative elements (e.g., lacking the 
precision offered by numeric models), through commitment to computational modeling, 
it becomes semi-formal (e.g., most people viewing the model can agree on what it 
describes), reliable (e.g., the same sets of organization conditions and environmental 
factors generate the same sets of behaviors) and explicit (e.g., much ambiguity inherent in 
natural language is obviated). This, particularly when used in conjunction with the 
descriptive natural language theory of our extant literature, represents a substantial 
advance in the field of organization analysis and design, and it offers direct application to 
research and practice associated with DMO. 
Additionally, when modeling aggregations of people—such as work groups, 
departments or whole organizations—one can augment the kind of symbolic model from 
above with certain aspects of numeric representation. For instance, the distribution of 
skill levels in an organization can be approximated—in aggregate—by a Bell Curve; the 
probability of a given task incurring exceptions and requiring rework can be specified—
organization wide—by a distribution; and the irregular attention of a worker to any 
particular activity or event (e.g., new work task or communication) can be modeled—
stochastically—to approximate collective behavior. As another instance, specific 
organization behaviors can be simulated hundreds of times—such as through Monte 
Carlo techniques—to gain insight into which results are common and expected versus 
rare and exceptional. 
Of course, applying numeric simulation techniques to organizations is hardly new 
(Law and Kelton, 1991), but this approach enables us to integrate the kinds of dynamic, 
qualitative behaviors emulated by symbolic models with quantitative metrics generated 
through discrete-event simulation. It is through such integration of qualitative and 
quantitative models—bolstered by reliance upon sound theory and empiric validation—
that our approach diverges most from extant research methods and offers new insight into 
organization and DMO dynamics. 
We summarize the key POWer elements via Table 1 for reference. Most of these 
elements are discussed below, but this table provides a concise summary. The interested 









Abstract representations of any work that consumes time, is required for project completion and can 
generate exceptions.
Actors A person or a group of persons who perform work and process information. 
Exceptions
Simulated situations where an actor needs additional information, requires a decision from a 
supervisor, or discovers an error that needs correcting.
Milestones
Points in a project where major business objectives are accomplished, but such markers neither 
represent tasks nor entail effort.
Successor links
Define an order in which tasks and milestones occur in a model, but they do not constrain these events 
to occur in a strict sequence. Tasks can also occur in parallel. POWer offers three types of successor 
links: finish-start, start-start and finish-finish.
Rework 
links
Similar to successor links because they connect one task (called the driver  task) with another (called 
the dependent  task). However, rework links also indicate that the dependent task depends on the 
success of the driver task, and that the project's success is also in some way dependent on this. If the 
driver fails, some rework time is added to all dependent tasks linked to the driver task by rework links. 
The volume of rework is then associated with the project error probability settings.
Task 
assignments
Show which actors are responsible for completing direct and indirect work resulting from a task.
Supervision 
links
Show which actors supervise which subordinates. In POWer, the supervision structure (also called the 
exception-handling hierarchy) represents a hierarchy of positions, defining who a subordinate would 
go to for information or to report an exception.  
 
B. POWER IMPLICATIONS 
POWer has been developed directly from Galbraith’s information processing 
view of organizations. This view of organizations, described in detail by Jin and Levitt 
(1996), has three key implications. 
The first is ontological: we model knowledge work through interactions of tasks 
to be performed, actors communicating with one another and performing tasks, and an 
organization structure that defines actors’ roles and constrains their behaviors. Figure 1 
illustrates this view of tasks, actors and organization structure. As suggested by the 
figure, the organization structure ontology is a network of reporting relations; which can 
capture micro-behaviors such as managerial attention, span of control and empowerment. 
The task structure ontology is a network of activities; which can capture organization 
attributes such as expected duration, complexity and required skills. Within the 
organization structure, we further model various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design 
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engineer, manager); which can capture organization attributes such as skills possessed, 
levels of experience and task familiarity. Within the task structure, we further model 
various sequencing constraints, interdependencies and quality/rework loops; which can 
capture considerable variety in terms of how knowledge work is organized and 
performed. 
 
Figure 1 Information Processing View of Knowledge Work 
 
As suggested by the figure also, each actor within the intertwined organization 
and task structures has a queue of information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned work 
activities, messages from other actors, meetings to attend) and a queue of information 
outputs (e.g., completed work products, communications to other actors, requests for 
assistance). Each actor processes such tasks according to how well the actor’s skill set 
matches those required for a given activity, the relative priority of the task, the actor’s 
work backlog (i.e., queue length), and how many interruptions divert the actor’s attention 
from the task at hand. 
The second implication is computational: work volume is modeled in terms of 
both direct work (e.g., planning, design, manufacturing) and indirect work (e.g., decision 
wait time, rework, coordination work). Measuring both direct and indirect work enables 
the quantitative assessment of (virtual) process performance (e.g., through schedule 
growth, cost growth, quality). 
The third implication is validational: the computational modeling environment 
has been validated extensively, over a period spanning roughly three decades, by a team 
of over 30 researchers (Levitt 2004). This validation process has involved three primary 
streams of effort: 1) internal validation against micro-social science research findings and 
Communications






against observed micro-behaviors in real-world organizations, 2) external validation 
against the predictions of macro-theory and against the observed macro-experience of 
real-world organizations, and 3) model cross-docking experiments against the predictions 
of other computational models with the same input data sets (Levitt et al., 2005). As such, 
ours is one of the few, implemented, computational organization modeling environments 
that has been subjected to such a thorough, multi-method trajectory of validation. 
Further, in addition to the broad and general validation noted here, as noted 
above, POWer has been adapted specifically to the military domain (Looney & Nissen, 
2006) and employed effectively on many occasions (e.g., see Nissen, 2007; Gateau et al., 
2007; Koons et al., 2008; Oros & Nissen, 2010). This provides a powerful capability to 
model and analyze military organizations, environments and contexts such as DMO. 
 
C. POWER MODEL EXAMPLE 
As an example, Figure 2 depicts a screenshot of the POWer computational 
environment that was used to model a US Military joint task force (JTF) at a relatively 
high level (e.g., see Gateau et al., 2007). The organization structure is represented by the 
light (green) person icons at the top of the figure. These correspond to the top three 
hierarchical levels of the JTF. There are clearly many levels below these that remain 
obscured in this abstracted model. The task structure is represented by light (yellow) 
rectangle icons, which are interconnected by dark (black) precedence, medium (red) 
feedback and other (colored) links. The dark (blue) links interconnect organization actors 
with their tasks (i.e., depicting job assignments), and the medium (purple) trapezoid box 
at the top represents the set of standing meetings (e.g., Commander’s Brief) that occur 
routinely. Similarly colored (purple) links indicate which actors are required to 
participate in such meetings. The interested reader can peruse several articles for details 
(e.g., see Looney & Nissen, 2006; Nissen, 2007; Gateau et al., 2007; Koons et al., 2008; 
Oros & Nissen, 2010). 
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Figure 2 POWer Model Screenshot 
 
Behind this graphic interface lies the sophisticated modeling and simulation 
facility of POWer, complete with many dozens of model parameters that can be set to 
specify a diversity of different organizations and environments. Clearly our DMO models 
may look somewhat different than the JTF representation depicted in the screenshot, but a 
major aspect of our modeling approach entails specifying such models in terms of the 
organization and task structures; their associated links; precedence, feedback, job-
assignment and meeting links; and the many model parameters required to represent 
faithfully the structure and behavior of DMO organizations and environments in the field.  
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. METHOD SUMMARY 
We employ the method of computational experimentation to conduct this research 
project, and we use the POWer modeling and simulation environment described above 
for such purpose. Like laboratory or field experimentation, computational experiments 
are designed in advance and conducted with precise controls and theoretically driven 
manipulations. The key difference is that computational experiments enable complete 
control over variables and constants—hence incredible internal validity—and they permit 
unlimited and exact replication. This supplies experimentation power unavailable 
through other methods.  
Alternatively, computational experimentation does not provide the same level of 
external validity available through laboratory and especially field experiments. Thus, 
computational experimentation can be viewed best as a complement to its laboratory and 
field counterparts. Indeed, viewing research as a trajectory of experimentation, one can 
begin prudently with computational experiments—through which hundreds or even 
thousands of experiments can be conducted—and then select a relatively small number of 
highly promising conditions and results to take into the physical laboratory—which is 
costlier and more time-consuming but offers greater external validity. From there, in turn, 
one or two exceptionally promising experiments can be taken into the field—which is 
still more costly and time-consuming but offers even greater external validity. With a 
skillful experimentation trajectory such as this, the best results can be integrated in turn 
into the organization. 
In short, we employ POWer to develop a computational model that represents our 
DMO organization, technology and environment, and we analyze maritime operations at 
sea to specify such model. This is accomplished deliberately in two stages, with the 
corresponding research planned as a multiyear project. The first stage described in this 
report focuses on establishing a computational environment suitable for DMO modeling, 
simulation and analysis. In this first effort, we model, simulate and analyze maritime 
operations as they are conducted today, with a particular focus on both manned and 
unmanned aircraft intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. This 
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establishes a baseline for comparison with one or more, alternate DMO organizations 
conducting ISR missions. It also establishes a baseline for comparison with other 
missions (e.g., strike, air defense, surface warfare). The second stage then proceeds to 
model, simulate and analyze one or more, alternate DMO organizations. 
With a baseline model established, we then identify a set of manipulations to 
represent different autonomy degrees and interdependence levels, and we specify a robust 
battery of dependent measures to gauge comparative performance across manipulations. 
This defines a set of computational experiments, which produce empirical results for 
analysis. 
In the balance of this section we first summarize our computational experiment, 
then we outline the specification and tailoring of the POWer computational environment, 
followed by a summary of independent and dependent variables. We proceed in turn to 
specify the computational models representing 24 experiment conditions, organizing the 
discussion by interdependence level: pooled, sequential, reciprocal and integrated. 
 
B. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
Our focal AS domain in this study centers on the use of multiple, manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in an operational military context; that is, different 
aircraft are employed in a potentially hostile environment. More specifically, we focus on 
aircraft employed onboard one or more ships underway at sea. Both manned and 
unmanned aircraft are capable of conducting missions at sea, and manned-unmanned 
aircraft interactions appear to be particularly interesting, problematic and challenging in 
terms of DMO, both as combatants and sensors.  
In this particular study, we concentrate on manned and unmanned aircraft that 
conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, which require 
searching for, identifying, tracking and relaying real-time information regarding vessels 
and like items of interest in the open ocean. Future studies can address the combatant role 
more specifically, and they can work to integrate combatant-sensor roles more closely. 
Aircraft under investigation in this study must take off from ships underway at 
sea, navigate to their operating areas, conduct ISR operations, and then return to ship 
without exhausting their fuel. Weather and other conditions permitting, the aircraft 
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operate 24 x 7 x 365, and we set the nominal duration of an ISR mission at approximately 
24 hours in this research scenario. Where a particular aircraft type is unable to stay aloft 
for a whole day’s mission, the organization must plan and operate a succession of aircraft 
sorties to replace one another on station until the mission is complete. We discuss these 
and like details in greater depth below. 
The focal organization in this study is a representative but generic Task Force, to 
which we refer as “CTF” (Task Force). Within the CTF organization we have multiple 
representative but generic Task Groups, to which we refer as “CTG” (Task Group; e.g., 
CTG-1, CTG-2, CTG-n). Within the particular CTG organization of focus in this study 
(i.e., CTG-1), we have multiple representative but generic platform organizations, 
including “CVW” (Air Wing; e.g., CVW-1), “DDG” (Destroyer; e.g., DDG-1) and 
“LCS” (Littoral Combat Ship; e.g., LCS-1). It important to note that these refer to (in 
some cases large) organizations of people, not the commanders alone2. 
Additionally, within each of these platform organizations, we have representative 
but generic operators. Specifically, within CVW-1, we include two F-18 jets (“F18-1” 
and “F18-2”) and two MH-60 helicopters (“H60-1c” and “H60-2c”; the “c” refers to 
carrier based helos), along with four UAVs (“L4-1,” “L4-2,” “L5-1” and “L5-2”) all 
based on the carrier. Within DDG-1, we include two MH-60 helicopters (“H60-1d” and 
“H60-2d”; the “d” refers to DDG based helos) and two ScanEagles (“SE-1” and “SE-2”). 
Within LCS-1, we include two MH-60 helicopters (“H60-1l” and “H60-2l”; the “l” refers 
to LCS based helos) and two FireScouts (“FS-1” and “FS-2”). Beyond the CTG 
organization, we also include two Tritons among assets controlled at the CTF level (“TR-
1” and “TR-2”). We diagram and discuss this organization structure in greater detail 
below, but this provides the high level perspective reflected in Figure 3. 
 
2 We are familiar with the various warfare commanders (e.g., Air Warfare Commander [AW]) with 
prominent roles in task force organizations today. However, we wish to focus on the platforms (esp. ships 
and aircraft) and the corresponding organizations and people who operate them. 
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Figure 3 Representative and Generic Organization 
 
Further, we utilize a two dimensional framework to examine a range of 
increasingly complex employment characteristics in terms of DMO. These two 
dimensions include autonomy and interdependence. On the autonomy dimension we 
account for the technologic sophistication of the UAVs (Degree 0 – 5); on the 
interdependence dimension we account for the interdependence between multiple aircraft 
in concurrent operation (pooled, sequential, reciprocal, integrated), including both 
manned-only, unmanned-only and integrated manned-unmanned missions. We discuss 
each in turn. 
 
1. Autonomy 
Numerous frameworks have been developed to address and create taxonomies for 
autonomy (Martin et al., 2019). For several instances, the autonomy scale created for the 
Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle program consisted of four levels, and that created for 
the Army’s now-defunct Future Combat Systems program consisted of ten levels 
(Committee on Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations, 2005). A 2013 
RAND study for the Navy employed a scale with seven levels (Savitz et al., 2013). Prior 
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to this work, Thomas Sheridan advocated an autonomy scale consisting of ten levels 
along with proposing four dimensions (i.e., information acquisition, information analysis, 
decision selection, action implementation) for evaluation (Sheridan, 2002). The 
Committee on Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations proposed looking at 
levels of mission autonomy, incorporating two degrees of freedom (i.e., mission 
complexity, degree of automation; Committee on Autonomous Vehicles in Support of 
Naval Operations, 2005). The National Institute of Standards and Technology developed 
its generic Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems framework encompassing three 
degrees of freedom (i.e., human independence, mission complexity, environmental 
difficulty; Huang, 2008).  
Informed by but dissatisfied with the plethora of complicated, incomplete and 
incompatible frameworks outlined above, which do not support the TASP context well, 
the six autonomy degrees employed in this study derive from the domain of autonomous 
automobiles and are discussed in part by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (Fisher, 2013). This autonomy framework is relatively straightforward yet 
covers a substantial range of autonomy, and it accounts for tasks accomplished by both 
humans and machines, which aligns very well with our focus. Here we outline first the 
five degrees for autonomous automobiles, then we map such degrees to the UAV domain. 
Briefly, in the autonomous automobile domain, Degree 0 corresponds to no 
autonomy; the car must be controlled continuously by a person in the driver’s seat. 
Degree 1 corresponds to incorporation of standard safety features (e.g., antilock brake 
system [ABS], electronic stability system [ESS], adaptive cruise control [ACC]) that 
assist the driver with one specific aspect of controlling a vehicle. Degree 2 corresponds to 
two or more Degree 1 capabilities (e.g., automatic lane centering and adaptive cruise 
control) that integrate to enable a car to drive itself to a limited extent (e.g., within one 
particular lane of a specific road; person in driver’s seat ready to take control at any 
time). Degree 3 corresponds to incorporation of an autopilot, which enables the car to 
change lanes and roads to reach a predetermined destination, but the driver must stay 
engaged and ready to resume control if the car gets confused or into a situation beyond its 
capability. Degree 4 corresponds to a car that can start and complete an entire trip without 
human engagement (e.g., no driver or passengers; no one in driver’s seat). We also 
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include Degree 5, which is not part of the NHTSA scheme but is useful to differentiate 
between two progressive degrees of AS capability as summarized below. 
Mapping this loosely to the UAV domain, an important difference centers on the 
plural nature of autonomy. With autonomous cars, on the one side, the driving itself 
represents the key autonomous activity. With UAVs, alternatively, autonomous flying is 
clearly an important activity, but many of the aerial vehicles in our context are employed 
for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and they carry a diversity of 
“payload” sensors (e.g., electro-optical, infrared, radar), which must be directed and 
controlled. Indeed, in several respects autonomous flight represents the simpler activity, 
with autonomous payload control constituting the more difficult undertaking, particularly 
in a tactical setting. We integrate these two activities for UAVs in Table 2. 
Table 2 Cross-Domain Autonomy Degree Mapping 
Degree Automobile UAV 
0 No autonomy; continuous human control Manned aircraft; continuous local control of 
flight and sensor operation (F/A-18, MH-
60) 
1 Safety features (ABS, ESS, ACC) Remote manual control of flight and sensor 
operation (ScanEagle) 
2 Limited autonomous driving (lane control) Preprogrammed flight; remote manual 
control of sensor operation (FireScout) 
3 Autopilot (lane & road changes) Preprogrammed flight and sensor operation 
based on senior level tasking (Triton or 
Global Hawk) 
4 Full autonomy; human driver not required Autonomous decisions and flight and sensor 
operation (Future capability) fall short of 
manned system capability & performance 
5 n/a Autonomous systems match or outperform 
manned system capability & performance 
(Future capability) 
 
Degree 0 describes a (manned) aircraft that must be controlled continuously and 
locally by a person in the cockpit; this represents a relatively direct mapping from the 
automobile domain to its UAV counterpart. Additionally, one or more people in the 
cockpit must control the ISR sensors manually. An example could include missions 
flown in F/A-18 jets or MH-60 helicopters. Degree 1 describes an aircraft (e.g., UAV) 
that can be controlled continuously by a remote person (no one in the cockpit). This 
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manual control applies to both flight and sensor operation. An example could include 
missions flown with ScanEagle3 UAVs. 
Degree 2 represents a departure from those above and describes a UAV that can 
fly without continuous human control (e.g., via preprogrammed navigation), albeit with a 
human ready to take (remote) control when deemed necessary. Alternatively, the sensor 
payload must be controlled manually by remote. An example could include missions 
flown with FireScout UAVs. Degree 3 describes in turn a UAV that can both fly and 
operate sensors without continuous human control (e.g., via preprogrammed navigation 
and payload tasking). An example could include missions flown with the Triton or Global 
Hawk. As suggested via the examples, each of these degrees is represented by aircraft 
and technologies in use today. 
In contrast, Degree 4 describes a UAV that can both fly and operate sensors 
without continuous human control, but in addition to capabilities included in Degree 3, 
such aircraft do not require preprogramming (with the exception of initial mission 
tasking); they can determine their own flight paths, identify their own sensor targets, and 
operate their own payloads on the fly (esp. with artificial intelligence). At the time of this 
writing, such UAVs represent future capabilities. For experimentation purposes, we 
define Degree 4 systems as falling short of manned system capability and performance, 
however.  
Alternatively, Degree 5 extends to match or exceed the capability and 
performance achievable through manned aircraft systems. In other words, both Degree 4 
and 5 systems represent future capabilities that enable autonomous flight and sensor 
operation; the former are unable to match the capability and performance of manned 
systems, whereas the latter are able to meet or surpass manned aircraft capability and 
performance. 
For each manned and unmanned aircraft identified to correspond with the six 
autonomy degrees summarized above, we conduct both archival and field research to 
specify computational models in a manner that mirrors physical aircraft behavior and 
performance through the corresponding models. For reference, Appendix A – Section A 
summarizes performance characteristics (e.g., endurance, crew, cost per flight hour, 
 
3 Remote manual control is an option, but not required. 
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required sorties, cost per head) for each of the seven types of aircraft examined in this 
study (i.e., F/A-18, MH-60, ScanEagle, FireScout, Triton, Level 4 & Level 5 UAVs).  
 
2. Interdependence 
The interdependence dimension derives from Organization Theory (Thompson, 
1967). It characterizes the intensity of interactions and behaviors within an organization. 
At its most basic, pooled interdependence describes how different units of an 
organization (e.g., different departments, groups, functions) can each contribute to the 
overall operation and success of the organization but without direct interaction with one 
another. An organization’s legal department and its building maintenance unit, for 
instance, reflect pooled interdependence as such: they both contribute to the same 
organization’s overall operation and success, but the legal and maintenance units do not 
interact with one another commonly. Coordination between units characterized by pooled 
interdependence is minimal and accomplished through rules and standards generally, for 
each unit operates independently. 
Sequential interdependence subsumes its pooled counterpart but incorporates the 
additional interactions associated with one unit in the organization producing outputs 
necessary for subsequent performance by another unit. An organization’s engineering and 
manufacturing units, for instance, reflect sequential interdependence as such: the designs 
developed within the engineering unit are used as inputs to the products built within the 
manufacturing unit. Coordination between units characterized by sequential 
interdependence is more intensive and accomplished via plans and schedules generally. 
Reciprocal interdependence subsumes its pooled and sequential counterparts but 
incorporates the additional interactions associated with two units working simultaneously 
on a common task. A surgeon and nurse operating on a patient, for instance, reflect 
reciprocal interdependence as such: the surgeon and nurse must perform certain tasks 
simultaneously, even switching some common tasks over time, and neither surgeon nor 
nurse can anticipate all possible outcomes or issues that might emerge through surgery 
(e.g., they must observe and communicate together, and they must react and adjust jointly 
as the surgery progresses). Coordination between units characterized by reciprocal 
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interdependence is highly intensive and accomplished via recurring feedback and mutual 
adjustment generally. 
We include the integrated interdependence type also—although it extends the 
organization theory summarized above—to characterize two different organizations that 
work together in manners reflecting reciprocal interdependence. Hence, beyond having 
two different units within the same organization performing reciprocally (e.g., as 
described above), such units must do so across different organizations, for example in a 
joint project where neither organization is solely “in charge” of the whole effort; many 
strategic partnerships, joint spinoffs and complex endeavors, for several instances, reflect 
this property (e.g., see Alberts & Hayes, 2006). 
In the UAV domain, pooled interdependence refers to two or more, different 
aircraft—manned or unmanned—that contribute to the overall operation and success of 
the organization but without direct interaction with one another. Say that two different 
aircraft perform surveillance missions in separate geographical areas. The surveillance 
from both aircraft is useful to the organization, but neither aircraft interacts with the 
other. Coordination can be via specific deconfliction rules, for instance, that prohibit two 
aircraft from flying in the same airspace at the same time. 
Sequential interdependence refers to two or more, different aircraft that share 
pooled interdependence but also depend upon one another over time. Say that one aircraft 
performs a surveillance mission and provides targeting information for a different 
aircraft. Coordination can be via air plans, for instance, that schedule the second aircraft 
to fly after receiving useful targeting information from the first one. 
Reciprocal interdependence refers to two or more, different aircraft that share 
pooled and sequential interdependence but must also work simultaneously on a common 
task. Say that two—manned or unmanned—aircraft are required to defend one another if 
either is attacked, or consider two different aircraft conducting surveillance, together, in 
common airspace. Coordination requires frequent communication between the aircraft, 
for instance, and both must adjust their actions depending upon circumstances. 
Integrated interdependence refers to reciprocally interdependent missions with 
both manned and unmanned aircraft “organizations” flying and working together toward 
a common objective. Say that two—manned and unmanned—aircraft from different 
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squadrons are required to defend one another if either is attacked, or consider such 
different aircraft conducting surveillance, together, in common airspace. Coordination 
entails all of the aspects associated with reciprocal interdependence, but they must take 
place across both manned and unmanned aircraft (e.g., squadrons). Table 3 summarizes 
this interdependence scheme for the UAV domain. 
Table 3 Interdependence Level Summary 
Interdependence Level Mission Characteristics 
Pooled Aircraft performing surveillance 
missions in different geographic 
areas 
Sequential Surveillance from one aircraft 
provides surveillance or targeting 
information for another 
Reciprocal Manned OR unmanned aircraft work 
together in common airspace 
Integrated Manned AND unmanned aircraft 
work together in common airspace 
 
 
3. Experiment Conditions 
With these two dimensions, we can consider—in a systematic and orderly 
manner—a 6x4 matrix of increasingly complex DMO baseline contexts, which comprise 
collectively our set of experiment conditions. We summarize this context matrix in Table 
4. At the one extreme, we consider two manned aircraft that are deployed in separate 
geographical regions of controlled airspace (e.g., within the vicinity of its host ship) or in 
the same geographical region but at different times. This corresponds to Degree 0 
autonomy with pooled interdependence (i.e., labeled “D0P” in the table).  
Table 4 Computational Experiment Design Summary 
Degree\Interdependence Pooled Sequential Reciprocal Integrated 
Degree 0 D0P D0S D0R D0I 
Degree 1 D1P D1S D1R D1I 
Degree 2 D2P D2S D2R D2I 
Degree 3 D3P D3S D3R D3I 
Degree 4 D4P D4S D4R D4I 
Degree 5 D5P D5S D5R D5I 
 
At the other extreme, we consider a squadron of completely autonomous, Level 5 
UAVs and a squadron of manned aircraft flying integrated missions in uncontrolled 
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airspace. This corresponds to a group of Degree 5 UAVs reflecting both reciprocal 
interdependence among themselves and integrated interdependence with their manned 
aircraft counterparts (i.e., labeled “D5I” in the table). Each of the key intermediate 
conditions (i.e., Degree 0 to Degree 5 autonomy, across all four interdependence 
conditions) is examined systematically also for completeness. This matrix summarizes 
our computational experiment design. 
As described in greater detail below, each of these 24 experiment design cells is 
represented by a separate computational model, which is simulated 50 times, across eight 
performance dimensions, to create a substantial performance space for analysis. In this 
present study, we examine each of these 24 test cases in terms of extant maritime aircraft 
ISR missions. This establishes a baseline for comparison. 
 
C. POWER SPECIFICATION AND TAILORING  
As noted above, POWer is designed and validated to represent and simulate the 
structures and behaviors of organizations in a manner that supports computational 
experiments. Such design and validation focus on people in the organization that use 
many different kinds of tools, machines and other technologies to perform work. To the 
extent that our maritime ISR context centers on people using aircraft, communication and 
other technologies to accomplish work, the POWer computational environment serves us 
very well, for as noted in the introduction, we have adapted it for and validated it in the 
military domain previously (e.g., see Looney & Nissen, 2006; Nissen, 2007; Gateau et 
al., 2007; Koons et al., 2008; Oros & Nissen, 2010). 
For instance, all of the conditions reflecting Degree 0 and 1 sophistication (i.e., 
across all interdependence cases) appear to be well within extant POWer capability, and 
one can argue that those reflecting Degree 2 and 3 sophistication are within such 
capability too, for humans remain in charge of machines and are ready to retake control at 
any time. This is not much different than a human operating a machine that is capable of 
performing a limited set of actions on its own but that requires human input and attention 
to perform the complete set. 
Air traffic controllers (ATCs), as one example, use sophisticated radar, computer 
and communication technologies to keep track of and manage myriad aircraft flying 
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through their assigned regions of airspace. Although many such technologies can operate 
independently (e.g., automatic radar position tracking)—and the aircraft themselves are 
capable of flying without ATC or pilot input—the ATC remains in charge of the airspace 
and is ready to control the aircraft’s position at any time (esp. in case of potential 
collision or emergency). 
Another example, albeit somewhat trivial, pertains to the exceedingly common 
case of a person using a washing machine to clean laundry. Once loaded with laundry and 
detergent, and set for the desired water level and temperature, the washing machine can 
complete the cleaning cycle without human intervention. Nonetheless, few washing 
machines can load or unload themselves, and the human must at least monitor the 
machine in case it gets off balance or manifests some other issue. POWer can model 
these and like cases well in its present condition. 
Further, we consider Degree 4 and 5 UAVs and other AS to behave in manners 
that are consistent with the behaviors of people (esp. their human counterparts) in our 
maritime ISR context. Degree 4 UAVs behave consistently with, and their Degree 5 
counterparts further match (or exceed) the capability and performance of, comparable 
manned systems. Indeed, most extant AS are designed to emulate human behaviors, and 
the more sophisticated the AS, the more closely its behavior mirrors that of human 
counterparts. However, people and machines possess different characteristics and 
capabilities (e.g., machines excel at consistency, memory, processing power, endurance; 
people excel at judgment, innovation, adaptation and working with uncertainty), and 
understanding their relative behaviors in the maritime ISR context demonstrates both the 
novelty and potential of our present line of research. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF CONTROLS, MANIPULATIONS AND MEASURES 
Here we summarize the controls, manipulations and measures used in our 
computational experiments. The POWer computational environment has roughly 100 
model variables and parameters that can be set and manipulated across different values 
and levels. Also, the models themselves can be set up in many different ways—as 
delineated via the model screenshots in the sections below—but the set of key variables 
and parameters associated with maritime ISR models along the lines of those developed 
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and analyzed in this investigation numbers roughly 30 (Looney & Nissen, 2006; Nissen, 
2007; Gateau et al., 2007; Koons et al., 2008; Oros & Nissen, 2010).  
 
1. Controls 
Appendix A – Section B summarizes the model task specifications, which refer to 
POWer model parameter settings related to the tasks that actors perform within the 
organization. Such tasks include those required for operational leadership, decision 
making and staff work at various levels of the organization (i.e., CTF, CTG, CVW, DDG 
and LCS organizations), along with those performed by aircrews themselves (e.g., Take 
Off, Navigate, Operate). Principal task parameters include type, effort, skill, requirements 
complexity, solution complexity, uncertainty and rework. The set of tasks examined 
through this study is held constant throughout all experiment conditions; that is, the exact 
same set of ISR mission tasks is conducted by every aircraft type, at every autonomy 
degree and across every interdependence level. Hence model tasks—and their 
corresponding parameter settings—serve as one set of controls in our computational 
experiment. For instance, the simulated ISR mission has a planned duration4 set at 24 
hours, and this planned duration is constant across all experiment cells. 
Appendix A – Section C summarizes the model staffing specifications, which 
refer to POWer model parameter settings related to the organization actors that perform 
tasks. The model includes 12 actor positions, five at the command/staff level (i.e., CTF, 
CTG, CVW, DDG, LCS) and one for each aircrew corresponding to our seven aircraft 
types (i.e., F/A-18, MH-60, ScanEagle, FireScout, Triton, Level 4 & Level 5 UAVs). 
Principal organization staffing parameters include position, level, role, application 
experience, culture experience, full time equivalent, salary and skill. The set of staffing 
positions examined through this study is held largely constant throughout all experiment 
conditions; that is—with two exceptions (i.e., role, application experience)—the exact 
same organization and staff conduct missions across every aircraft type, autonomy degree 
 
4 Planned mission duration does not necessarily correspond to the amount of time actually required for 
successful mission performance, however. Missions that progress relatively smoothly (e.g., with few 
interruptions or mistakes) may be completed within the planned duration, whereas those that encounter 
problems may require (much) longer to complete successfully, and actual mission duration represents an 
important performance measure, which we examine expressly through the computational experiments 
discussed below. 
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and interdependence level. Hence model staffing—and the corresponding parameter 
settings—serve as another set of controls in our computational experiment. For instance, 
the simulated ISR mission is conducted by exactly two aircraft, and this number of 
aircraft is constant across all experiment cells. 
Appendix A – Section D summarizes baseline model parameters, which serve to 
further specify the DMO model. Most of these parameters are subject to manipulation 
across experiment conditions, and hence are summarized below, but functional exception 
probability, mission exception probability, mission priority, work day and work week are 
all held constant across conditions and serve therefore as additional controls; that is, the 
level for each of these parameters is constant across all experiment cells. 
 
2. Manipulations 
Alternatively, Appendix A – Section E summarizes the model parameters subject 
to manipulation: team experience, centralization, formalization, matrix strength, 
communication probability, noise probability, role and application experience. These are 




Finally, Appendix A – Section F summarizes the eight model measures: duration, 
rework, coordination, wait, work cost, functional risk, mission risk and maximum 
backlog. These measures enable us to gauge maritime ISR performance robustly through 
multiple dimensions. 
 
E. POOLED INTERDEPENDENCE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
We begin by specifying the baseline (i.e., D0P) model and then characterize 
variations across the matrix of experiment conditions pertaining to pooled 
interdependence. This takes us from Degree 0 through Degree 5 autonomy. Here in the 
main body of the report we keep our discussion at a relatively high level. Detailed model 
specifications are included for reference in Appendix A. 
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1. Baseline Model (D0P) 
Figure 4 delineates a screenshot of our baseline CTG organization and platform 
set. This is the same organization outlined above and delineated via Figure 3. The light 
(green) person icons represent organizations at four levels (i.e., CTF, CTG, Platform 
[e.g., DDG, LCS], Aircraft Operators [e.g., F/A-18, MH-60]). The dark (brown) rectangle 
icons represent operational leadership, decision making and staff work in addition to 
common tasks (e.g., planning, maintenance, air traffic control), whereas the light (yellow) 
rectangle icons represent the aircraft ISR mission tasks; each aircraft must take off, 
navigate to its area of interest, operate in ISR mode, and then return to the ship for 
landing or recovery. Organizations and tasks are represented at appropriate levels: 
sufficiently low to capture the important structural and behavioral dynamics, but 
sufficiently high to abstract away details that do not impact the results in terms of 
maritime ISR. 
 
Figure 4 Baseline Model (D0P) – CVN F/A-18s 
 
At the lowest level in the organization lies an array of diverse manned 
(light/green) and unmanned (dark/blue) aircraft. F/A-18s (Degree 0) are assigned to the 
CVN. MH-60s (Degree 0) are assigned to one or more DDGs and LCSs as well as the 
CVN. ScanEagles (Degree 1) are assigned to the DDGs, and FireScouts (Degree 2) are 
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assigned to the LCSs. Tritons (Degree 3) are examined as an asset from beyond the CTG 
itself (e.g., controlled by the CTF), and we examine two future AS (Degree 4 & 5 UAVs) 
principally in terms of CVN assignment here5.  
The many lines linking various icons in the figure are used to symbolize 
organization hierarchy, job assignment, task precedence, communication and other 
important model relations. For instance, the (dark/red) links connecting the Operate and 
Navigate tasks denote rework; if the Operate task fails to produce satisfactory ISR results 
(e.g., a promising contact is not located, insufficient intelligence is gathered, sensor data 
cannot be relayed), then the aircraft may have to Navigate to some other region and 
Operate there. The interested reader can refer to Gateau and colleagues (2007) for 
detailed explanations for all key model links and parameters. 
In the baseline screenshot above, two (manned) F/A-18s are assigned to fly ISR 
missions in separate airspaces (i.e., D0P: Degree 0 autonomy, pooled interdependence). 
This task assignment is evident from the five (dark/blue) links between each F/A-18 actor 
and the aircraft ISR mission tasks (e.g., Take Off, Navigate, Operate); the first actor 
(labeled “F18-1” in the figure) is assigned to the upper sequence of tasks (e.g., labeled 
“Take Off 1,” “Navigate 1,” “Operate 1”), and the second actor (labeled “F18-2” in the 
figure) is assigned to the lower sequence of tasks (e.g., labeled “Take Off 2,” “Navigate 
2,” “Operate 2”). Here both (manned) aircraft are assigned to the same (CVN) platform 
and (CVW) organization, and each flies in a different region of airspace (pooled 
interdependence). This represents a very common and relatively straightforward maritime 
ISR context. 
As noted above, the simulated ISR mission has a planned duration6 set at 24 
hours. For aircraft such as the F/A-18s depicted in this model, such nominal 24 hour 
duration exceeds the endurance of a single aircraft sortie, so a sequence of sorties must be 
planned to span the whole 24 hour period, and sorties may have to continue beyond 24 
hours in order to accomplish all mission objectives. We consider each aircraft’s 
 
5 Understanding that the corresponding Degree 4 and 5 technology has yet to be fielded and developed, 
respectively, these UAVs could be either fixed or rotary wing (or both), and hence could potentially operate 
effectively from the CVN and other ship platforms (esp. DDG, LCS). 
6 Not all missions are equally effective, however, so some may take less than 24 hours to accomplish all 
ISR objectives successfully, whereas other may require (much) more time to complete. 
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performance characteristics (esp. endurance) when specifying the computational model, 
and we record each aircraft’s simulated performance level (e.g., actual mission duration) 
in the computational experiment. Refer to Appendix A for model specification details. 
The MH-60 represents another Degree 0 (manned) aircraft, so we also model and 
examine the baseline (D0P) case with missions conducted by two helicopters for 
comparison. This is depicted in the screenshot of Figure 5. As above, this task assignment 
is evident from the five (dark/blue) links between each MH-60 actor and the aircraft ISR 
mission tasks (e.g., Take Off, Navigate, Operate). Here both (manned) aircraft are 
assigned to the same (CVN) platform and (CVW) organization, and each flies in a 
different region of airspace. This represents another very common and relatively 
straightforward maritime ISR context. 
 
Figure 5 Baseline Model (D0P) – CVN MH-60s 
 
As one would expect, two different kinds of aircraft can fly ISR missions in 
separate regions of airspace as well. For instance, we further model and examine the 
baseline (D0P) case with missions conducted by two, different, manned aircraft (i.e., one 
F/A-18 and one MH-60). This is depicted in the screenshot of Figure 6. As above, this 
task assignment is evident from the five (dark/blue) links between each actor (i.e., F/A-18 
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& MH-60) and the aircraft ISR mission tasks (e.g., Take Off-1, Navigate-1, Operate-1, 
Take Off-2, Navigate-2, Operate-2). Here both (manned) aircraft are assigned to the same 
(CVN) platform and (CVW) organization (albeit different squadrons), and each flies in a 
different region of airspace. This represents another relatively straightforward maritime 
ISR context, but it draws in actors from different squadrons, and it requires coordinating 
and controlling two different types of aircraft (e.g., fixed wing jet and rotary wing helo). 
 
Figure 6 Baseline Model (D0P) – CVN F/A-18 & MH-60 
 
Further, suitably capable aircraft can conduct these same missions from other 
ships as well. MH-60s, for instance, can operate from the DDG and LCS. The screenshot 
in Figure 7 delineates two helos operating from one or more DDG platforms7.  
 
7 Another model (not shown) represents two MH-60s operating from one or more LCS ship platforms. 
Organization demands and implications are highly similar. 
 31 
 
Figure 7 Baseline Model (D0P) – DDG MH-60s 
 
Still further, suitably capable aircraft can operate simultaneously from different 
ships. For instance, Figure 8 reflects a screenshot of the model representing one MH-60 
helicopter conducting its ISR mission from a DDG and another conducting its mission (in 
separate airspace) from an LCS. Other combinations (e.g., CVN-DDG, CVN-LCS; not 
shown) are modeled and simulated too for completeness.  
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Figure 8 Baseline Model (D0P) – DDG MH-60 & LCS MH-60 
 
Hence our D0P experiment condition includes eight8 different models. Each such 
model depicts Degree 0 autonomy (i.e., manned aircraft) and pooled interdependence 
(i.e., separate airspace), but the eight models vary as the ISR mission is conducted by 
different types of aircraft (i.e., F/A-18, MH-60) from various platforms (i.e., CVN, DDG, 
LCS). To limit confusion, each of these “D0P” models includes additional information to 
identify the specific ships and aircraft involved. For instance, “D0P CVN 1818” refers to 
the (pooled interdependence) ISR mission being conducted by two (Degree 0) F/A-18 
aircraft from the CVN, “D0P CVN 6018” refers to the ISR mission being conducted by 
one MH-60 and one F/A-18 aircraft from the CVN, “D0P CVN 6060” refers to the ISR 
mission being conducted by two MH-60 aircraft from the CVN, and so forth; We 
summarize these eight models in Table 5. 
  
 
8 Technically additional models can be envisioned also. For instance, an F/A-18 can operate from the 
carrier, and a MH-60 can operate from the LCS. As another instance, multiple (manned) aircraft types can 
operate from multiple ship platforms. Our eight models provide adequate coverage of organization and 
platform variations, so we do not endeavor to model exhaustively here. 
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Table 5 D0P Model Summary 
Label Ships Aircraft 
D0P CVN 1818 CVN F/A-18, F/A-18 
D0P CVN 6018 CVN MH-60, F/A-18 
D0P CVN 6060 CVN MH-60, MH-60 
D0P DDG 6060 DDG MH-60, MH-60 
D0P LCS 6060 LCS MH-60, MH-60 
D0P DDLC 6060 DDG, LCS MH-60, MH-60 
D0P CVLC 6060 CVN, LCS MH-60, MH-60 




2. D1P Model 
Following the format used to describe the baseline D0P model above, here we 
characterize Degree 1 autonomy models with pooled interdependence (D1P). Unlike with 
the eight baseline D0P models discussed above, we have only one model to represent 
D1P: two ScanEagles operate from one or more DDG platforms (“D1P DDG SESE”). 
Because the (unmanned) ScanEagle aircraft operate in separate airspaces, one each can 
be controlled from a separate DDG ship. One can consider further the mission conducted 
with two ScanEagles controlled from a single, suitably configured ship (e.g., as 
diagrammed with DDG-1 here)—operating in separate airspaces—without undue 
complication, although shipboard launch and recovery must be coordinated more closely, 
and additional technical details require attention9. We include a screenshot for this model 
in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Model D1P – DDG ScanEagles 
 
 
9 This also creates some technical issues in terms of locating and operating multiple control stations, 
placing multiple antennae, selecting compatible frequencies, and like considerations that we abstract away 
in this study. 
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3. D2P Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 2 autonomy 
models with pooled interdependence (D2P). As with the D1P case discussed above, we 
have only one model to represent D2P: two FireScouts operate from one or more LCS 
platforms (“D2P LCS FSFS”). Because the (unmanned) FireScout aircraft operate in 
separate airspaces, one each can be controlled from a separate LCS ship. As above, one 
can consider further the mission conducted with two FireScouts controlled from a single, 
suitably configured ship (e.g., as diagrammed with LCS-1 here)—operating in separate 
airspaces—without undue complication, although shipboard launch and recovery must be 
coordinated more closely, and additional technical details require attention. We include a 
screenshot for this model in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 Model D2P – LCS FireScouts 
 
4. D3P Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 3 autonomy 
models with pooled interdependence (D3P). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D3P: two Tritons operate from land (“D3P CTF TRTR”). Here we presume that 
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the CTF asserts authority over the Tritons and that they operate in separate airspaces. We 
include a screenshot for this model in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Model D3P – Tritons 
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5. D4P Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 4 autonomy 
models with pooled interdependence (D4P). We present one of several models to 
represent D4P: two “Level 4” UAVs operate from the CVN (“D4P CVN L4L4”). As 
noted above—depending upon the technology and capability that end up being developed 
and fielded (e.g., fixed wing, rotary wing)—such Level 4 UAVs could potentially be 
based on other ship platforms (e.g., DDG, LCS), but we associate them solely with the 
CVN here in this model10. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Model D4P – L4 UAVs 
 
6. D5P Model 
Completing this format for the pooled interdependence models, here we 
characterize Degree 5 autonomy models (D5P). As above, we present one of several 
models to represent D5P: two “Level 5” UAVs operate from the CVN (“D5P CVN 
L5L5”). As above—depending upon the technology and capability that end up being 
developed and fielded (e.g., fixed wing, rotary wing)—such Level 5 UAVs could 
 
10 Some model iterations representing integrated interdependence include L4 and L5 UAVs operating from 
other ship platforms. We describe these in their corresponding sections below. 
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potentially be based on other ship platforms (e.g., DDG, LCS), but we associate them 
solely with the CVN here in this model. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 
13. 
 
Figure 13 Model D5P – L5 UAVs 
 
F. SEQUENTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
Sequential interdependence computational models are specified next. In our 
maritime ISR domain, particularly with respect to the nominal 24 hour mission duration 
specified in these models, pooled and sequential interdependence do not differ 
appreciably. Consider, for instance, the case of two aircraft sorties that must be 
conducted, in succession (e.g., due to endurance limitations), in a common area of 
airspace. Under sequential interdependence, information gleaned by the first aircraft (e.g., 
noteworthy intelligence) would be used as a basis for the second aircraft’s mission. This 
is practically identical to tasking a second aircraft to conduct ISR operations in the same 
region of airspace in which the first aircraft is operating. For example, a second aircraft 
could be assigned to continue surveilling a vessel of interest located and identified by a 
first aircraft that runs low on fuel.  
In some contexts and missions, sequential interdependence will likely have 
important modeling and analytical implications. In our current maritime ISR context and 
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nominal 24 hour mission duration, alternatively, this sequential interdependence 
experiment condition reveals little above what we discover through the pooled 
interdependence models and simulations, so we do not discuss it further in this technical 
report. 
 
G. RECIPROCAL INTERDEPENDENCE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
In great contrast to sequential interdependence, our examination of reciprocal 
interdependence reveals much. We continue by characterizing variations across the 
matrix of experiment conditions pertaining to reciprocal interdependence. As above, this 
takes us from Degree 0 through Degree 5 autonomy. Also as above, here in the main 
body of the report we keep our discussion at a relatively high level. Detailed model 
specifications are included for reference in Appendix A. 
 
1. D0R Model 
Continuing with the format used to describe the pooled interdependence models 
above, here we characterize Degree 0 autonomy models with reciprocal interdependence 
(D0R). As with the eight baseline D0P models discussed above, we have all of the same 
(manned and unmanned) aircraft and ship platform combinations to model. However, for 
space considerations, we present only one D0R model here: two F/A-18s operate from 
the CVN (“D0R CVN 1818”).  
The key difference between this model and its pooled interdependence 
counterpart discussed above is that the two aircraft (F/A-18s in this case) fly and conduct 
the ISR mission together, in common airspace. Consider, for instance, one aircraft 
operating as Wingman for the other operating as Leader. Operating as such in common 
airspace exerts some additional organization demands (e.g., planning, scheduling and 
monitoring two aircraft), but it is commonplace.  
It also requires additional, ongoing communication between the two aircraft, 
which is represented in the model via (light/green) communication links between key 
tasks (esp. Navigate 1 and Navigate 2; Operate 1 and Operate 2). Notice, for instance, 
how such links interconnect two tasks performed by each of the aircraft (i.e., the task 
Navigate-1, which is assigned to the actor F/A-18-1 [Leader], is linked to the task 
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Navigate-2, which is assigned to the actor F/A-18-2 [Wingman]; the task Operate-1, 
which is assigned to the actor F/A-18-1 [Leader], is linked to the task Operate-2, which is 
assigned to the actor F/A-18-2 [Wingman]). This reflects the need for the two aircraft to 
communicate frequently throughout the mission, but in particular as they navigate to and 
operate on station for the ISR mission. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 
14. 
 
Figure 14 Model D0R – CVN F/A-18s 
 
2. D1R Model 
Following the format used to describe the baseline D0R model above, here we 
characterize Degree 1 autonomy models with reciprocal interdependence (D1R). As 
above, we have only one model to represent D1R: two ScanEagles operate in common 
airspace from one or more DDG platforms (“D1R DDG SESE”). Also as above, 
operating as such in common airspace exerts additional organization demands, and it 
requires additional, ongoing communication, even between such unmanned aircraft. In 
particular, because these Degree 1 autonomy aircraft are operated remotely, most such 
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communication is conducted between remote aircrews11 (onboard ship). We include a 
screenshot for this model in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Model D1R – DDG ScanEagles 
 
3. D2R Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 2 autonomy 
models with reciprocal interdependence (D2R). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D2R: two FireScouts operate in common airspace from one or more LCS 
platforms (“D2R LCS FSFS”). Also as above, operating as such in common airspace 
exerts additional organization demands, and it requires additional, ongoing 
communication, even between such unmanned aircraft. In particular, because these 
Degree 2 autonomy aircraft are operated remotely, most such communication is 
conducted between remote aircrews12 (onboard ship). We include a screenshot for this 
model in Figure 16. 
 
 
11 An additional consideration of interest pertains to the ScanEagle’s inability to sense other aircraft in 
flight. Such sensing must be accomplished by the remote aircrews. 
12 An additional consideration of interest pertains to the FireScout’s inability to sense other aircraft in 
flight. Such sensing must be accomplished by the remote aircrews. 
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Figure 16 Model D2R – LCS FireScouts 
 
4. D3R Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 3 autonomy 
models with reciprocal interdependence (D3R). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D3R: two Tritons operate from land in common airspace (“D3R CTF TRTR”). 
Here we presume that the CTF asserts authority over the Tritons and that they operate in 
common airspace. Also as above, operating as such in common airspace exerts additional 
organization demands, and it requires additional, ongoing communication, even between 
such unmanned aircraft. However, because these Degree 3 autonomy aircraft are operated 
somewhat autonomously (e.g., preprogrammed flight), most such communication is 
conducted between remote aircrews13 (on land). We include a screenshot for this model 
in Figure 17. 
 
 
13 An additional consideration of interest pertains to the Triton’s inability to sense other aircraft in flight. 
Such sensing must be accomplished by the remote aircrews. 
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Figure 17 Model D3R – Tritons 
 
5. D4R Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 4 autonomy 
models with reciprocal interdependence (D4R). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D4R: two “Level 4” UAVs operate in common airspace from the CVN (“D4R 
CVN L4L4”). Also as above, operating as such in common airspace exerts additional 
organization demands, and it requires additional, ongoing communication, even between 
such unmanned aircraft. However, because these Degree 4 autonomy aircraft operate 
autonomously, most such communication is conducted between the UAVs themselves. 
This represents a notable advance over the current state of the practice14. We include a 
screenshot for this model in Figure 18. 
 
 
14 We presume this UAV’s ability to sense other aircraft in flight. Remote aircrews are not required to 
accomplish such sensing. 
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Figure 18 Model D4R – L4 UAVs 
 
6. D5R Model 
Completing this format for the reciprocal interdependence models, here we 
characterize Degree 5 autonomy models (D5R). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D5R: two “Level 5” UAVs operate in common airspace from the CVN (“D5R 
CVN L5L5”). Also as above, operating as such in common airspace exerts additional 
organization demands, and it requires additional, ongoing communication, even between 
such unmanned aircraft. However, as with Degree 4 counterparts, because these Degree 5 
autonomy aircraft operate autonomously, most such communication is conducted between 
the UAVs themselves. This represents a notable advance over the current state of the 
practice15. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 19. 
 
 
15 We presume this UAV’s ability to sense other aircraft in flight. Remote aircrews are not required to 
accomplish such sensing. 
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Figure 19 Model D5R – L5 UAVs 
 
H. INTEGRATED INTERDEPENDENCE COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
As with reciprocal interdependence above, our examination of integrated 
interdependence reveals much also. We continue by characterizing variations across the 
matrix of experiment conditions pertaining to integrated interdependence. As above, this 
takes us from Degree 0 through Degree 5 autonomy. Also as above, here in the main 
body of the report we keep our discussion at a relatively high level. Detailed model 
specifications are included for reference in Appendix A. 
 
1. D0I Model 
Continuing with the format used to describe the models above, here we 
characterize Degree 0 autonomy models with integrated interdependence (D0I). Recall 
from above that integrated interdependence subsumes its reciprocal counterpart; that is, 
multiple aircraft fly together in common airspace. The key difference is that such 
integrated interdependence missions include both manned and unmanned aircraft flying 
together in common airspace. Recall further, however, that the definition of Degree 0 
autonomy (e.g., continuous local control of flight and sensor operation) excludes 
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unmanned aircraft, hence there is no model for D0I; that is, Degree 0 autonomy is limited 
to manned aircraft only. Hence we skip ahead immediately to D1I, in which a Degree 0 
manned aircraft flies with a Degree 1 unmanned counterpart. 
2. D1I Model 
Continuing with the format used to describe the models above, here we 
characterize Degree 1 autonomy models with integrated interdependence (D1I). As 
above, we have only one model to represent D1I: one MH-60 and one ScanEagle operate 
in common airspace from one or more DDG platforms (“D1I DDG 60SE”). Clearly such 
integrated interdependence missions include both manned and unmanned aircraft flying 
together in common airspace. Consider, for instance, one unmanned aircraft (e.g., 
ScanEagle) operating as Wingman for a manned aircraft (e.g., MH-60) operating as 
Leader. Operating as such in common airspace exerts enormous organization demands16.  
As with our models representing reciprocal interdependence, it also requires 
additional, ongoing communication, which is depicted in the model via (light/green) 
communication links between the Navigate and Operate tasks. Moreover, because 
integrated interdependence exerts enormous organization demands, we include 
communication links between the manned and unmanned aircraft (i.e., MH-60, 
ScanEagle) and their ship platforms (i.e., DDGs), in addition to links between such ship 
platform organizations and the two echelons above (i.e., CTG, CTF). This represents a 
huge advance over the current state of the practice. We include a screenshot for this 
model in Figure 20.  
 
 
16 Such demands are likely to be organizational and cultural in addition to technical. 
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Figure 20 Model D1I – DDG MH-60 & ScanEagle 
 
3. D2I Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 2 autonomy 
models with integrated interdependence (D2I). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D2I: one MH-60 and one FireScout operate in common airspace from one or 
more LCS platforms (“D2I LCS 60FS”). As above, operating as such in common 
airspace exerts enormous organization demands17, and it requires additional, ongoing 
communication, even between manned and unmanned aircraft, in addition to higher 
organization echelons. This represents a huge advance over the current state of the 
practice. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 21. 
 
 
17 Such demands are likely to be organizational and cultural in addition to technical. 
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Figure 21 Model D2I – LCS MH-60 & FireScout 
 
4. D3I Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 3 autonomy 
models with integrated interdependence (D3I). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D3I: one F/A-18 operates from the carrier, and one Triton operates from land in 
common airspace (“D3I CVN 18TR”). Here we presume that the CTF asserts authority 
over the Triton and that the CVW has authority over the F/A-18. As above, operating as 
such in common airspace exerts enormous organization demands18, and it requires 
additional, ongoing communication, even between manned and unmanned aircraft, in 
addition to higher organization echelons. This represents a huge advance over the current 
state of the practice. We include a screenshot for this model in Figure 22. 
 
 
18 Such demands are likely to be organizational and cultural in addition to technical. 
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Figure 22 Model D3I – F/A-18 & Triton 
 
5. D4I Model 
Continuing with this same format, here we characterize Degree 4 autonomy 
models with integrated interdependence (D4I). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D4I: one MH-60 and one “Level 4” UAV operate in common airspace from the 
CVN (“D4I CVN 60L4”). As above, operating as such in common airspace exerts 
enormous organization demands19, and it requires additional, ongoing communication, 
even between manned and unmanned aircraft, in addition to higher organization 
echelons. This represents a huge advance over the current state of the practice. We 
include a screenshot for this model in Figure 23. 
 
 
19 Such demands are likely to be organizational and cultural in addition to technical. 
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Figure 23 Model D4I – MH-60 & L4 UAV 
 
6. D5I Model 
Completing this format for the integrated interdependence models, here we 
characterize Degree 5 autonomy models (D5I). As above, we have only one model to 
represent D5I: one F/A-18 and one “Level 5” UAV operate in common airspace from the 
CVN (“D5I CVN 18L5”). As above, operating as such in common airspace exerts 
enormous organization demands20, and it requires additional, ongoing communication, 
even between manned and unmanned aircraft, in addition to higher organization 
echelons. This represents a huge advance over the current state of the practice. We 
include a screenshot for this model in Figure 24. 
 
 
20 Such demands are likely to be organizational and cultural in addition to technical. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. RESULTS OVERVIEW 
In this section we present the key findings and results of our computational 
experiments. We first characterize results from our fieldwork and computational 
modeling effort. We then present findings and discuss results of our computational 
experimentation.  
 
B. FIELDWORK AND COMPUTATIONAL MODELING RESULTS 
This study requires extensive fieldwork to understand both the manned and 
unmanned aircraft inventories available to and used by the Navy and other military 
services today. Through a nearly exhaustive investigation of diverse aircraft employed for 
ISR missions in general, we focus on those capable of and employed for ISR at sea. 
Within this set, we focus on two manned aircraft, one fixed wing (i.e., F/A-18) 
and one rotary wing (i.e., MH-60), and we work to understand their essential ISR mission 
capabilities, uses, behaviors and performance characteristics. Because both of these 
aircraft types have been in use for considerable time, abundant data exist for specifying 
our computational models, and because both types reflect manned aircraft, their 
associated organization implications are understood relatively well. 
Within this set, we focus further on three unmanned aircraft reflecting diverse 
autonomy degrees, sizes, speeds, capacities, endurances and other characteristics: 1) 
ScanEagle, 2) FireScout and 3) Triton. Unlike their manned counterparts, however, these 
unmanned aircraft are relatively new to the Fleet at the time of this writing, and their 
associated organization implications are being discovered still. 
Additionally, this study is forward looking and seeks to both anticipate and guide 
DMO well into the future21, so we focus on two UAV autonomy levels beyond those in 
the current unmanned aircraft inventory, to which we refer simply as “Level 4” and 
“Level 5” UAVs. Because these unmanned aircraft have yet to be deployed or developed, 
respectively, we must estimate their likely future capabilities, uses, behaviors and 
 
21 Indeed, we endeavor to maintain our research focus roughly 10 years ahead of emerging practice. 
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performance characteristics, and we must extrapolate through computational modeling 
their associated organization implications. 
The operational knowledge and detailed UAV understanding possessed by our 
research team elucidates the key information required to understand these seven diverse 
aircraft, and the extended fieldwork enables us to specify the computational models and 
establish an organization experimentation capability that has never existed previously. 
This represents a substantial achievement through our research study. 
As summarized in the preceding section, we develop and specify a set of 
computational models covering the whole matrix of 24 experiment conditions, and we 
partially replicate several such conditions by examining different variations within some 
cells. For instance, the cell D0P (autonomy degree 0, pooled interdependence) includes 
multiple different variations, in which we examine the ISR mission conducted by F/A-
18s as well as MH-60s, operated from the CVN, DDG and LCS. In total we develop, 
specify, execute and analyze more than 36 different DMO models to cover the 24 
experiment conditions. 
Table 6 summarizes this model set. The first column lists each of the six 
autonomy degrees (e.g., “D0” = Degree 0; “D5” = Degree 5), and the second column 
designates which ship platforms22 the ISR aircraft operate from (e.g., “CVN” = carrier, 
“DDG” = destroyer, “LCS” = littoral combat ship, “LCDD” = littoral combat ship + 
destroyer23). The third column designates which two aircraft types conduct each ISR 
mission (e.g., “1818” = two F/A-18s, “6060” = two MH-60s, “60SE” = one MH-60 and 
one ScanEagle).  
The remaining three columns are marked (x) to indicate where computational 
models have been developed. In all models where two aircraft of the same autonomy 
degree conduct a mission (e.g., two F/A-18s, two MH-60s, two ScanEagles), we examine 
all three interdependence levels (i.e., pooled, reciprocal, integrated24), but where a 
 
22 The Triton is land-based, and we presume that it comes under CTF control, hence the “CTF” designation. 
23 Where two different ship platforms are involved, we use only two letters for each, and we begin with the 
ship associated with the Leader aircraft. For instance, “LCDD” signifies that the Leader aircraft flies from 
an LCS and that the Wingman aircraft flies from a destroyer, whereas “DDLC” indicates that the Leader 
aircraft flies from a destroyer and that the Wingman aircraft flies from an LCS. 
24 Speaking technically, integrated interdependence does not apply to missions flown solely by two manned 
or two unmanned aircraft; that is, integrated interdependence applies only to missions flown by both 
manned and unmanned aircraft. Nonetheless, several model parameter settings differ between reciprocal 
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combination of manned and unmanned aircraft conduct a mission together (e.g., one MH-
60 and one ScanEagle or FireScout, one F/A-18 and one Triton, one MH-60 or F/A-18 
and one Level 4 or 5 UAV25), by definition only the integrated interdependence level 
applies, and hence only a single model is developed. 
Table 6 Summary of DMO Models 
Model Summary
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 x x x
CVN 6060 x x x
DDG 6060 x x x
LCS 6060 x x x
D1 DDG SESE x x x
DDG 60SE x
LCDD 60SE x
D2 LCS FSFS x x x
LCS 60FS x
DDLC 60FS x
D3 CTF TRTR x x x
CVCT 18TR x
D4 CVN L4L4 x x x
CVN 60L4 x
DDCV 60L4 x
D5 CVN L5L5 x x x
CVN 18L5 x
CVDD 18L5 x  
 
Each model is specified using aircraft performance data collected through our 
archival and field research. Appendix A – Section A summarizes aircraft performance 
data (e.g., endurance, crew size, sorties) for reference. Each model is specified using ISR 
mission and tasks also (e.g., CTF/CTG/CVW command and staff work, aircraft 
navigation and ISR operation), the inputs for which derive from our archive and 
fieldwork too. Appendix A – Section B summarizes model task specifications for 
 
and integrated interdependence experiment conditions, and it is informative to examine even all-manned or 
all-unmanned aircraft missions through both such conditions. 
25 An implicit assumption is that the Level 4 UAV will be rotary wing helo, and hence tend to fly with the 
MH-60, and that the Level 5 UAV will be fixed wing jet, and hence tend to fly with the F/A-18. 
Nonetheless, for our purposes, we also examine some different combinations (e.g., Level 4 or 5 could be a 
vertical take-off and landing jet). 
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reference. Model staffing specifications (e.g., position, role, experience) derive similarly 
from our archival and field research also; they’re summarized in Appendix A – Section C 
for reference. The set of parameters (e.g., centralization, formalization, communication 
probability) set to specify the baseline (i.e., D0P) model derive likewise from our 
archival and field research; they’re summarized in Appendix A – Section D for reference.  
Archival and field research inform us further regarding which parameters to vary 
systematically (e.g., team experience, matrix strength, noise probability) for our model 
manipulations across experiment conditions; they’re summarized in Appendix A – 
Section E for reference. Model measures are inherent to the POWer computational 
environment, through which a huge number of parameters are available to serve as 
dependent variables. Our archival and field research guide us to focus on and employ 
only the set of model measures (e.g., duration, work cost, mission risk) appropriate for 
our context; they’re summarized in Appendix A – Section F for reference.  
As we specify and run these various models across the matrix of experiment 
conditions, it is important to reiterate that the same tasks are performed by the same 
number of people, with the same skills, in the same organizations, across all of our 
experiment conditions. This gives us an extreme level of experiment control. 
 
C. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS 
In this section we present findings and discuss results of our computational 
modeling and experimentation. We keep the data presentation at a relatively high level 
here in the body of this technical report, but we include great detail in Appendix B, in 
both numeric and graphic formats, for reference. Because we have so much data—
through 36 different models 26, each simulated 50 times, across six autonomy degrees and 
four interdependence levels, assessed through eight performance dimensions—concise 
summarization is challenging. Leaving detailed summaries to Appendix B, here we focus 
on the most informative findings and results, and we organize the discussion in three 
parts: 1) Autonomy Degree, 2) Interdependence Level, and 3) DMO Implications. 
 
 
26 As noted above, in total we develop, specify, execute and analyze more than 36 different models to cover 
the 24 experiment conditions. 
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1. Autonomy Degree 
Regarding autonomy degree, we can generalize to say that none of our 
performance measures varies linearly with increasing autonomy. Some—but not all—
differences stem from the nature of the various aircraft types. Three relatively clear 
findings in this regard pertain to the measures duration, functional risk and work cost. 
Figure 25 delineates duration results (e.g., the total clock or calendar time required to 
complete a mission successfully; expressed in hours) across six autonomy degrees. For 
clarity—and to eliminate confounding from crossing interdependence levels—we show 
results for pooled interdependence only here, but the pattern holds for the other 
interdependence levels too27. When discussing duration, it is important to recall from 
above that the simulated ISR mission has a planned duration28 set at 24 hours, but actual 
time required to complete a mission successfully can vary clearly. In other words, this 
planned duration is constant across all experiment cells, but actual mission duration is a 
performance variable that we measure and compare through this computational 
experiment. 
 
27 In each figure, we include results for every model denoted in Table 6. In the present case of pooled 
interdependence delineated here, all nine pooled interdependence models are summarized. 
28 Planned mission duration does not necessarily correspond to the amount of time actually required for 
successful mission performance, however. Missions that progress relatively smoothly (e.g., with few 
interruptions or mistakes) may be completed within the planned duration, whereas those that encounter 
problems may require (much) longer to complete successfully, and actual mission duration represents an 






















































Figure 25 Duration – Pooled Interdependence 
 
The vertical bars in the chart denote duration for each model (listed horizontally 
across the chart bottom). The four models to the left (i.e., one labeled “1818” [two F/A-
18s from the CVN], and three labeled “6060” [two MH-60s from the CVN, two MH-60s 
from the DDG, two MH-60s from the LCS]) correspond to Degree 0 autonomy (i.e., 
manned aircraft) and all reflect relatively similar duration29 results (e.g., roughly 30 
hours). The next three models (i.e., labeled “SESE,” “FSFS” and “TRTR”) correspond to 
Degree 1 through 3 autonomy (i.e., unmanned aircraft in use today) and all reflect 
comparatively higher duration results (e.g., roughly 34 hours). The final two models (i.e., 
labeled “L4L4” and “L5L5”) correspond to Degree 4 and 5 autonomy (i.e., future 
unmanned aircraft) and both reflect duration results similar to those of Degree 0 aircraft.  
The similarities and differences stem in large part from the comparatively higher 
skill and culture experience that manned aircraft crews maintain over their (Degree 1 – 3) 
unmanned counterparts. The higher skill in particular leads to fewer mistakes, hence 
lesser functional risk, and enables manned aircraft to complete missions in less time 
(duration). As UAVs (are expected to) become more advanced, this skill differential is 
 
29 Keep in mind that duration (i.e., the time required for successful mission completion) is distinct from 
endurance (i.e., how long a particular aircraft type can fly). The F/A-18 aircraft, for instance, has endurance 
of roughly 1.5 hours, whereas endurance of the MH-60 is closer to 4.0 hours. To conduct a nominal 24 hour 
ISR mission, 16 F/A-18 sorties would be required, whereas only six would be required of the MH-60. This 
pertains to endurance. In terms of duration, however, both aircraft types are able to complete the ISR 
mission in roughly 30 hours. 
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anticipated to lessen (Degree 4 autonomy) and could even tip the other way (Degree 5 
autonomy). Likewise with culture experience: as unmanned missions become 
increasingly integral—and perhaps even primary—to ISR, culture experience should 
increase and show negligible differential with respect to manned missions. 
Figure 26 delineates functional risk (e.g., the fraction of effort that would be 
required to address residual functional mistakes; expressed in percentages) results across 
the same six autonomy degrees and models. The pattern is very similar to and stems from 
the same factors that drive duration results. Note, for instance, the difference between 
results for the MH-60 (Degree 0) and FireScout (Degree 2) aircraft. In many 
organizations, the same crew members who fly the MH-60 helicopters also pilot and 
operate sensors for the FireScout. However, even such crewmembers have likely spent 
many, many more hours training on and operating the MH-60 than the FireScout, hence 
the skill difference. Moreover, such crewmembers are embedded deeply within the 
culture of manned aircraft—which has evolved through all the decades of manned 
aviation—whereas the culture of unmanned aircraft remains relatively nascent. Consider, 
for instance, the status differences at play in the Ward Room, Ready Room, ashore and 
other venues between aviators who fly manned aircraft versus those who control UAVs 


















































Figure 26 Functional Risk – Pooled Interdependence 
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Figure 27 delineates a very different pattern in terms of work cost (e.g., operating 
cost of a mission; expressed in $k) across the six autonomy degrees. Although our cost 
parameters are very rough and approximate, they support the pattern delineated in this 
figure: different aircraft can incur dramatically different operating costs for performing 
the same, nominal, 24 hour ISR mission.  
Succinctly, the F/A-18 appears to represent the costliest ISR platform, yet it also 
exhibits the greatest speed and mission flexibility (e.g., attack). The MH-60 costs roughly 
half as much to operate, is comparable to the FireScout, and has distinct capabilities (e.g., 
rescue operations). The Triton costs in turn about half as much as the FireScout, and the 
ScanEagle—along with the Degree 4 & 5 UAVs30—is expected to cost much less to 


















































Figure 27 Work Cost – Pooled Interdependence 
 
Other findings stem more from considerations across autonomy degrees. Four 
explanatory findings in this regard pertain to the measures coordination, wait, mission 
risk and maximum backlog. Figure 28 delineates coordination results (e.g., the amount of 
effort expended to coordinate mission activities; expressed in person-hours k) across six 
 
30 Degree 4 & 5 UAVs represent future capabilities, and hence clearly have no operating cost data from 
which to draw. As summarized in Appendix A – Section A, we set costs for Degree 4 and 5 UAVs at the 
same levels as the ScanEagle. From the perspective of today’s technology, this probably appears to be 
biased low, but given that we are forecasting future capabilities (e.g., processing power, miniaturization, 
integration, materials, nanotechnologies and like advances), any such bias may not be severe. 
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autonomy degrees. As above, we show results for pooled interdependence only here, but 
the pattern holds for the other interdependence levels too. Here we observe two different 
levels of coordination: 1) the manned aircraft and FireScout all reflect relatively higher 
levels (e.g., 13 – 15 person-hours), whereas 2) the other unmanned aircraft reflect lower 
levels (e.g., 3 – 4 person-hours).  
Two factors appear to be playing parts: crew size and sorties. Generally, the 
higher the crew size and greater the number of sorties required to complete a nominal 24 
hour ISR mission, the greater the coordination load. Although the F/A-18 has only a 
single pilot, this aircraft requires 16 sorties31 to complete a nominal 24 hour mission, 
hence its comparatively higher coordination load. Alternatively, although the Triton has a 
(land-based) crew of three, it requires only a single sortie to conduct the nominal 24 hour 
mission, hence its comparatively lower coordination load. The ScanEagle has a 
(shipboard) crew of one, and along with the Level 4 and Level 5 UAVs, endurance is 
























































Figure 28 Coordination – Pooled Interdependence 
 
 
31 Consider, for instance, how 16 pilots must be scheduled to fly their planes, at 16 different times; how 
such pilots must also be scheduled to rest, eat, plan the next mission and prepare for the subsequent flight; 
how each aircraft must be maintained and readied for flight at the right time; how the take off and 
navigation en route of each relieving flight must be coordinated, monitored and controlled with the return 
and landing of each flight that has been on station; and like factors. 
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Figure 29 delineates wait results (e.g., the amount of effort expended while 
awaiting information or direction; expressed in person-hours k) across six autonomy 
degrees and reflects pooled interdependence. We observe the same pattern. With fewer 
people and fewer sorties to plan, coordinate, monitor and control, there is less time spent 























































Figure 29 Wait – Pooled Interdependence 
 
Figure 30 delineates mission risk results (e.g., the fraction of effort that would be 
required to address residual mission mistakes; expressed in percentages) across six 
autonomy degrees and reflects pooled interdependence. Here a number of different 
factors tend to confound our ability to assign cause to the pattern. We have the same crew 
size and sortie issues as noted above, but mission risk is affected also by culture 
experience and skill in the POWer model, both of which are comparatively lower for the 
Autonomy 1 – 3 aircraft. This effect can cascade from making a greater number of 
mistakes, through differential rework levels, to higher fractions of residual, cross-




















































Figure 30 Mission Risk – Pooled Interdependence 
 
Figure 31 delineates maximum backlog results (e.g., the amount of effort required 
to address tasks that are ready for accomplishment but have not yet been accomplished; 
expressed in person-hours k) across six autonomy degrees and reflects pooled 
interdependence. Here a number of different factors tend to confound our ability to assign 
cause to the pattern also, but all of the comments pertaining to mission risk in the POWer 
model above apply here too. In particular, the two future unmanned aircraft (i.e., Level 4 
& 5 UAVs), with solitary crew size, long endurance, high culture experience and skill 





















































Figure 31 Maximum Backlog – Pooled Interdependence 
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2. Interdependence Level 
In examining autonomy above, we hold interdependence level constant (pooled) 
to help isolate the effects. Here we isolate and examine interdependence effects, which 
are relatively clear: greater levels of interdependence correspond to higher values across 
almost all performance measures. It is important to note that higher does not necessarily 
imply either “better” or “worse,” and some performance measures must be traded off 
against others (e.g., duration, rework, mission risk). Nonetheless, increasing 
interdependence makes almost all measures go up. This is clearly understandable in our 
context: as we pass through higher interdependence levels, the interactions between 
aircraft increase in frequency and intensity, and having multiple aircraft operating 
together in common airspace complicates their planning, operating, tracking, monitoring 
and intervening, particularly where manned and unmanned aircraft cooperate in common 
airspace-time.  
For instance, Figure 32 delineates the interdependence effect in terms of duration. 
Notice immediately how every experiment condition (shown horizontally across the chart 
bottom) reflects a monotonic duration increase with greater interdependence levels. 
Graphically, the (blue) vertical bars representing pooled interdependence are shorter than 
the corresponding (red) bars representing reciprocal interdependence. Missions take 
longer to complete with increasing interdependence levels. This is evident in particular 
with the transition from reciprocal to integrated interdependence. Recall that integrated 
interdependence subsumes its reciprocal counterpart but adds interorganizational 
interaction as well; that is, not only must multiple aircraft operate together in common 
airspace, teams of manned and unmanned aircraft must do so with integrated 




32 For instance, manned aircraft fly together in common airspace routinely. Pilots can see other aircraft 
aloft; they can communicate with one another; they hail generally from the same squadrons; and hence they 
know one another; plus, they probably fly together often. Alternatively, it is relatively rare for unmanned 
aircraft today to fly together in common airspace, for such aircraft (crews) generally are unable to sense 
one another in flight. Asking human pilots to fly with unmanned aircraft, and vice versa, invites great 
challenge and is a likely source of considerable controversy. 
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Figure 32 Duration – Interdependence Effect 
 
Figure 33 delineates an even more extreme effect in terms of coordination, but this 
same effect attenuates somewhat in terms of work cost (not shown). Coordinating 
multiple aircraft flying in common airspace has a major impact in terms of C2. This is the 
case in particular for the manned aircraft and FireScout. 
 
















































































































Conversely, Figure 34 delineates how interdependence appears to exert negligible 
influence over functional risk. Because functional risk, by definition, is limited to 
mistakes within functions and is driven largely by skill and experience, increasing 
interdependence levels should not be expected to affect it substantially. Simulation results 
confirm this expectation. 
 
Figure 34 Functional Risk – Interdependence Effect 
 
Figure 35 delineates a dramatically different story, however, as integrated 
interdependence exposes the ISR mission to roughly double the mission risk. With 
mission risk for integrated manned-unmanned sorties exceeding 70%, integrated 
interdependence appears clearly to have critical issues. Maximum backlog (not shown) 





















































Figure 35 Mission Risk – Interdependence Effect 
 
3. DMO Implications 
Here we draw from our findings above to consider the DMO implications of the 
computational experiment. We begin by highlighting, recapitulating and elaborating on 
some of the key findings and results above that signal issues in terms of current or future 
DMO. This aids us in terms of identifying likely causes of such issues, and it enables us 
to conceive one or more promising alternate approaches to organization. 
Starting with current aircraft in operational use today, there is little cause for 
concern regarding Autonomy 0 (e.g., F/A-18, MH-60) with pooled interdependence (e.g., 
operating in separate airspaces). This is something that the Navy knows how to do well. 
There are no DMO implications per se here. This is business as usual.  
Nonetheless, even though the organization appears to function acceptably well at 
present, several aspects of the extant and ubiquitous maritime organization and approach 
suggest that problems will emerge with continued advances in and integration of AS 
technology. For instance, the maritime organization reflects a tall, functional hierarchy, 
with considerable centralization, substantial formalization and frequent staff rotation. 
This makes for relatively long information flows and decision chains, coupled with 
perennial battles against knowledge loss from personnel turnover and challenges with 




















































Recall from above (reshown for reference here as Figure 36), for example, how 
even the operation of two manned aircraft (MH-60) involves the commanders, staffs, 
crews and operators from more than just a single ship platform (i.e., DDG and LCS in 
this case). This does not present any problems in terms of missions reflecting pooled 
interdependence (D0P), but even with manned aircraft, the situation complicates 
immediately with a transition to reciprocal interdependence (D0R): we find two aircraft 
being manned, flown and coordinated from different ships. Looking at the organization 
structure delineated in the figure, the lowest level role in the organization with authority 
over both aircraft is the CTG. Many organization experts would argue that the 
correspondingly long decision chains, information flows and staffing filters militate 
against efficient—or even effective—maritime ISR in a (D0R) situation like this. 
 
Figure 36 Baseline Model (D0P) – DDG MH-60 & LCS MH-60 
 
Further, the formalization inherent within this organization reflects a strong 
dependence upon written standards, rules and procedures (e.g., SOPs, TTPs, PPRs, work 
standards, job qualifications, organization interactions). Such standards, rules and 
procedures can be effective in organizations such as this that experience continuous 
personnel rotation, for the “business” of maritime ISR and other activities is written down 
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in explicit form to a large extent. For current missions involving manned aircraft, there is 
little issue, for the organization and its personnel have abundant experience in such 
context. 
The introduction and integration of unmanned aircraft, however, represent much, 
much more recent phenomena, which are requiring even longtime and familiar standards, 
rules and procedures to be rewritten. Moreover, the pace at which UAVs and other AS 
are being introduced and integrated appears to be accelerating. This suggests that 
formalization through written documents may have a hard time keeping up with rapid and 
local changes onboard various ships and among diverse aircrews.  
Instead, local knowledge develops in each command, on each ship and among 
each aircrew, but such knowledge remains largely tacit, inherent in the experiences of 
individual people and the teams on which they interact. Such local knowledge is unlikely 
to be standard across different commands, ships and aircrews, so people will not be able 
to rotate so fluidly as they do at present. As with the long decision chains, information 
flows and staffing filters noted above, many organization experts would argue here that 
the correspondingly high dependence upon standardization and written documentation 
militate against efficient—or even effective—maritime ISR. 
Indeed, when we move into Autonomy 1 – 3 (e.g., ScanEagle, FireScout, Triton), 
our results reveal several difficulties that arise. For instance, recall from above that 
unmanned aircraft take longer (duration) to complete the ISR mission than their manned 
counterparts and that they experience greater functional risk. This stems in large part 
from the comparatively higher skill and culture experience that manned aircraft crews 
maintain over their (Degree 1 – 3) unmanned counterparts. The higher skill in particular 
leads to fewer mistakes, and hence lesser functional risk, and enables manned aircraft to 
complete missions in less time (duration).  
In terms of DMO—and perhaps somewhat counter intuitively—our results imply 
that unmanned (ISR) missions require more planning, monitoring, intervening and like 
control activities than their manned counterparts. Greater numbers of staff—or more 
skilled and experienced staff members—will be required for unmanned than for manned 
missions, and such missions will take more time, suffer from more mistakes, and 
generally tax the organization more. Long decision chains, information flows and staffing 
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filters, combined with strong dependence upon written standards, rules and procedures, 
remain inherently at odds against the proliferation of unmanned aircraft in the context of 
constant personnel rotation and evolving local knowledge. 
Alternatively and eventually, as UAVs (are expected to) become more advanced, 
this skill differential is anticipated to lessen (Degree 4 autonomy) and could even tip the 
other way (Degree 5 autonomy). Likewise with culture experience: as unmanned 
missions become increasingly integral—and perhaps even primary—to ISR, culture 
experience should increase and show negligible differential with respect to manned 
missions. These increases in skill and experience will help to mitigate the organization 
tax imposed by unmanned missions, but it will likely be quite some time before the 
corresponding, future UAVs become operational, so we must continue to address and 
endure the higher load for now. This suggests strongly that we should consider 
redesigning our familiar maritime ISR organization to address the imminent 
shortcomings noted above. 
Recall further from above how increasing levels of interdependence correspond 
with monotonically longer mission durations. Parallel to the shift from manned to 
unmanned aircraft missions discussed above (e.g., in which durations extend from 
Autonomy 0 to Autonomy 1 – 3 aircraft), durations extend also as missions become 
increasingly interdependent. Two aircraft—whether manned or unmanned—impose 
greater organization demands when flying together in common airspace than alone in 
separate airspaces, and when both manned and unmanned aircraft fly together in common 
airspace this effect gets exacerbated. Hence the duration effect amplifies through the 
interaction of increasing autonomy and interdependence.  
As above, greater numbers of staff—or more skilled and experienced staff 
members—will be required for reciprocal than for pooled interdependence missions, and 
such missions will take more time, suffer from more mistakes, and generally tax the 
organization more. Such tax becomes even more severe with integrated interdependence, 
for which leaders, managers and policy makers must begin planning now. In particular, 
required skills and experiences may not be uniform across manned and unmanned 
missions, and the Military’s current maritime ISR organization and approach appear 
inadequate. 
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Indeed, the effects of accumulated experience and specialization suggest that we 
may find one set of personnel (e.g., planners, controllers, watch standers) that is 
proficient principally in terms of manned missions, whereas a different cadre of 
personnel becomes proficient principally in terms of unmanned missions. One may 
think—initially and perhaps naïvely—that “ISR missions are ISR missions.” However, 
our results suggest otherwise.  
Given our current maritime ISR organization and approach, this will limit the 
degree of flexibility available in terms of assigning suitably experienced personnel to 
different jobs, and many organizations will need to staff themselves with seemingly 
redundant personnel: some possessing skill and experience with manned operations and 
others possessing similar yet distinct skill and experience with their unmanned 
counterparts. As task interdependence continues its shift toward integrated manned-
unmanned missions, such similar yet distinct skill and experience will likely break down 
and become ineffective. Alternatively, as noted below, other approaches to organizing 
and conducting maritime ISR offer potential to mitigate these detrimental effects. 
Further, we find additional DMO insights that emerge from the measures 
coordination, wait, mission risk and maximum backlog. Coordination requirements 
increase substantially under reciprocal interdependence, as aircrews and others must 
interact much more closely during mission execution than under pooled interdependence, 
and an increase in mission exceptions and mistakes seems inevitable, particularly as 
multiple aircraft fly together from different ship platforms. This is the case even for 
manned aircraft missions.  
When we shift further to integrated manned-unmanned missions, moreover, 
computational results show that organization will complicate still more through decreases 
in team and application experience (e.g., manned and unmanned aircrews will have less 
experience working with one another than with themselves), increases in communication 
requirements (e.g., coordinating unmanned aircraft from land [e.g., Triton] with 
shipboard manned or unmanned aircraft will tax commanders, staff members and 
aircrews alike), amplified noise (e.g., many more distractions and interruptions33 will 
 
33 Recall, for instance, how unmanned aircraft (and crews) are generally unable to sense other aircraft aloft. 
Whereas two manned aircraft pilots can see one another’s aircraft and coordinate their mutual actions 
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impact ISR work), and lower level roles (e.g., commanders, staff members and aircrews 
will need to establish, change and refine procedures to accommodate rotating personnel 
and local mission demands).  
Results indicate further that wait times will lengthen, and mistakes will 
accumulate, as commanders and staff members become increasingly backlogged by 
exceptions, information requests and decision demands, which can cascade into 
progressively ever longer wait times, accumulations of mistakes and greater backlogs. 
Together these complications suggest that—with extant maritime ISR organizations and 
approaches—we will make more mistakes; experience increasing time pressure; require 
greater effort, more time and higher cost to conduct missions; and operate under 
conditions of substantially higher mission risk. Again, as noted below, other approaches 
to organizing and conducting maritime ISR offer potential to mitigate these detrimental 
effects. 
Additionally, the analysis in this study centers on only two aircraft conducting 
ISR missions. Yet we find evident and compelling issues with the organization even in 
this simple case. Consider further the implications in terms of scaling to large numbers of 
(manned and) unmanned aircraft flying in common airspace. Swarming, counter 
swarming and like tactics are being researched and developed now. If our maritime ISR 
organization and approach appear fragile with aircraft operating reciprocally (or 
integrally) only in pairs today, then one can imagine easily how such organization and 
approach could break under the load of tens or even hundreds (or possibly thousands) of 
aircraft operating simultaneously and reciprocally (or integrally). Imagine further the 
exacerbation stemming from a shift to strike and other missions that diverge from the ISR 
context of this study. 
Although clearly a significant amount of effort is on-going to develop the 
guidance necessary to mitigate risks associated with the lack of current standards and 
policy for unmanned systems, as noted above, written standards, rules and procedures 
may not be able to keep pace with continuing AS advances and mission integrations for 
much longer. Moreover, we note further how the continuous rotation of personnel may 
 
directly, even “simple” maneuvers such as flying on a leader’s wing become complicated with integrated 
interdependence. 
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necessitate the development and refinement of intensely local knowledge within each 
different command, onboard each different ship, and among each different aircrew. 
Organizations will need to learn how to learn more quickly, and the current approach to 
education and training—with a heavy emphasis upon failure-prone, on-the-job training 
(OJT) and perishable, just-in-case training (JIC)—will likely fail.  
Other, more advanced approaches to accelerating knowledge flows through 
maritime ISR organizations will likely become mandatory—so that people, teams and 
organizations can learn more quickly and with fewer mistakes—and people will need 
ways to learn just in time (JIT), knowing what to do and how to do it well in the local 
context (e.g., when and where such knowing is needed). The Military’s extant maritime 
ISR organization and approach appear to be unprepared to meet these organization 








The technologic capabilities of autonomous systems continue to accelerate. 
Although AS are replacing people in many skilled mission domains and demanding 
environmental circumstances, people and machines have complementary capabilities, and 
integrated performance by AS and people working together can be superior to that of 
either AS or people working alone. We refer to this increasingly important phenomenon 
as Teams of Autonomous Systems and People, and we identify a plethora of open, DMO 
research, policy and decision making questions.  
For one, under what circumstances should people work subordinate to AS (e.g., 
robot supervisor) versus controlling them (e.g., robot subordinate)? For another, under 
what circumstances should units comprised of people be organized, led and managed 
separately from counterparts comprised of AS (e.g., separate aircraft squadrons), and 
what circumstances favor instead organization integration of people and AS into 
combined units (e.g., integrated or composite squadrons; see CFFC, 2014)? For a third, 
how can researchers, policy makers and leaders develop confidence that their chosen 
DMO organization approach (e.g., to subordinating or superordinating robots to people, 
to separating or integrating AS and personnel units, to selecting missions involving 
collaboration between people and AS) will be superior? These technology-induced 
research questions are so new and foreign that negligible theory is available for guidance, 
and it is prohibitively time-consuming, expensive and error-prone to systematically test 
the myriad different approaches via operational organizations. This is the case in 
particular where loss of life, limb or liberty may be at stake. 
Computational experimentation offers unmatched yet largely unexplored potential 
to address DMO questions along these lines. Once computational models have been 
developed and validated, they can become virtual prototype DMO organizations to be 
examined empirically and under controlled conditions through efficient computational 
experiments. Moreover, such computational experimentation and comparison can be 
accomplished very quickly and at extremely low cost relative to that required to 
experiment with teams or organizations in the laboratory or especially in the field, with 
no risk of losing life, equipment or territory in the process. The central problem is, this 
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kind of DMO organization experimentation capability has yet to be developed and 
demonstrated.  
This is where our research project seeks to make an important contribution. 
Building upon a half century of research and practice in modeling and simulation in 
general, and a quarter century of organization modeling and simulation work in 
particular, we have access to computational modeling and simulation technology 
representing the current state of the art. Agent-based organization models developed 
through this technology have also been validated dozens of times to represent faithfully 
the structure, behavior and performance of counterpart real-world organizations. Plus, we 
have adapted the same computational modeling and simulation technology over several 
years to the military domain to examine joint task forces, distributed operations, 
computer network operations, and other missions that reflect increasingly common Navy, 
joint and coalition endeavors. 
In this technical report, we provide an overview of the POWer computational 
environment used to model and simulate DMO organizations and phenomena. We 
explain how qualitative and quantitative models can be integrated and executed to 
examine dynamic properties and behaviors of diverse DMO organizations and 
approaches. We explain further how POWer reflects an information processing view of 
organizations, and we elaborate its ontological, computational and validational 
implications. 
We summarize in turn the research method of computational experimentation. 
Like laboratory or field experimentation, computational experiments are designed in 
advance and conducted with precise controls and theoretically driven manipulations, but 
they further enable complete control over variables and constants—hence incredible 
internal validity—and they permit unlimited and exact replication. This supplies 
experimentation power unavailable through other methods. 
In short, we employ POWer to develop a computational model that represents our 
DMO organization, technology and environment, and we analyze maritime ISR 
operations to specify such model. This model and the associated operations focus on the 
CTG, with a CVN and one or more DDGs, LCSs and other ship platforms employed for 
 77 
both manned and unmanned aircraft ISR missions, with particular emphasis on DMO 
implications.  
We then identify a set of manipulations to represent six different autonomy 
degrees (Degree 0 – 5) and four increasing interdependence levels (Pooled, Sequential, 
Reciprocal, Integrated), and we specify a robust battery of eight dependent measures to 
gauge comparative performance across 24 computational experiment conditions. A 
unique computational model is developed for each experiment, simulated 50 times, and 
examined across our array of performance measures, which produce empirical results for 
analysis. Detailed model specifications—including experiment controls, manipulations 
and measures—are presented in Appendix A, and detailed results are presented in 
Appendix B, for reference. 
Key results follow, beginning with findings from our extensive fieldwork. 
Through a nearly exhaustive investigation of diverse aircraft employed for ISR missions 
in general, we focus on those capable of and employed for ISR at sea, and we decide to 
focus on two manned aircraft and three unmanned aircraft in operation today. To support 
our forward looking study, we also focus on two additional UAV autonomy levels 
beyond those in the current unmanned aircraft inventory. The operational knowledge and 
detailed UAV understanding possessed by our research team elucidates the key 
information required to understand these seven diverse aircraft, and the extended 
fieldwork enables us to specify the computational models to establish a DMO 
organization experimentation capability that has never existed previously. This represents 
a substantial achievement through our research study. 
We include key results pertaining to our computational modeling effort too, 
developing and specifying a set of computational models covering the whole matrix of 24 
experiment conditions. We further partially replicate several such conditions by 
examining different variations within some cells: developing, specifying, executing and 
analyzing more than 36 different models to cover the 24 experiment conditions.  
Highly insightful findings emerge from our campaign of computational modeling 
and experimentation, which we organize in three parts: 1) Autonomy Degree, 2) 
Interdependence Level, and 3) DMO Implications. Regarding autonomy degree, we can 
generalize to say that none of our performance measures varies linearly with increasing 
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autonomy. Nonetheless, autonomy degree is a very impactful variable, and we find major 
performance differences across the various manned and unmanned aircraft types, 
particularly in terms of the measures duration, functional risk and work cost. Specifically, 
the UAVs in our current inventory (Autonomy 1 – 3) take considerably longer to 
complete the ISR mission than either the manned (Autonomy 0) or future unmanned 
(Autonomy 4 & 5) aircraft. These same, current inventory UAVs also present greater 
functional risk. Both of these results stem from the lesser skill and experience levels 
associated with the corresponding UAV aircrews, with an accumulation of mistakes and 
required rework affecting mission duration and functional risk levels directly. This affects 
maritime ISR substantially, as longer durations and greater functional risk levels must be 
accommodated explicitly through mission planning, execution, monitoring and 
intervention activities. 
Work cost results affect maritime ISR substantially also, as different aircraft can 
incur dramatically different operating costs for performing the same, nominal 24 hour 
mission. Succinctly, the F/A-18 appears to represent the costliest ISR platform, yet it also 
exhibits the greatest speed and mission flexibility (e.g., attack). The MH-60 costs roughly 
half as much to operate, is comparable to the FireScout, and has distinct capabilities (e.g., 
rescue operations). The Triton costs in turn about half as much as the FireScout, and the 
ScanEagle—along with the Level 4 & 5 UAVs—is expected to cost much less to operate. 
All other considerations aside, the operating cost of an ISR mission could become an 
important consideration. 
Regarding interdependence level, we isolate and examine interdependence effects, 
which are relatively clear: greater levels of interdependence correspond to higher values 
(but not necessarily “better” or “worse”) across almost all performance measures. This is 
clearly understandable in our maritime ISR context, for interactions between aircraft 
increase in frequency and intensity, and having multiple aircraft operating together in 
common airspace complicates their planning, operating, tracking, monitoring and 
intervening. 
For instance, we find that missions take longer to complete with increasing 
interdependence levels. This is evident in particular with the transition from reciprocal to 
integrated interdependence. As another instance, we see clearly an even more extreme 
 79 
effect in terms of coordination. Coordinating multiple aircraft flying in common airspace 
has a major impact in terms of maritime ISR. A third instance centers on mission risk, 
which nearly doubles as we transition from reciprocal to integrated interdependence. 
Maritime ISR for integrated interdependence appears to have critical issues. 
Regarding DMO implications, we begin by summarizing findings pertaining to 
current aircraft in operational use today: there is little cause for concern regarding 
Autonomy 0 (e.g., F/A-18, MH-60) with pooled interdependence (e.g., operating in 
separate airspaces). This is something that the Navy knows how to do well. There are no 
implications per se here. This is business as usual. 
Nonetheless, even though maritime ISR appears to function acceptably well at 
present, several aspects of the extant and ubiquitous, military organization and approach 
suggest that problems will emerge with continued advances in and integration of AS 
technology. For instance, the organization reflects a tall, functional hierarchy, with 
considerable centralization, substantial formalization and frequent staff rotation. This 
makes for relatively long information flows and decision chains, coupled with perennial 
battles against knowledge loss from personnel turnover and challenges with cross-
functional (and even more so with joint and coalition) interaction.  
As another instance, the formalization inherent within this organization reflects a 
strong dependence upon written standards, rules and procedures, but the pace at which 
UAVs and other AS are being introduced and integrated appears to be accelerating, and 
such formalization through written documents may have a hard time keeping up with 
rapid and local changes onboard various ships and among diverse aircrews. Many 
organization experts would argue that both instances militate against efficient—or even 
effective—maritime ISR. 
Indeed, these study results imply—somewhat counter intuitively—that unmanned 
(ISR) missions require more planning, monitoring, intervening and like control activities 
than their manned counterparts. Given our current maritime ISR organization and 
approach, greater numbers of staff—or more skilled and experienced staff members—
will be required for unmanned than for manned missions, and such missions will take 
more time, suffer from more mistakes, and generally tax the organization more. Although 
the capabilities of future UAVs may mitigate these effects to some extent, we must 
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continue to address and endure the higher load for now, and we should consider 
redesigning our familiar, military organization to address the imminent shortcomings 
noted above. 
Further, required maritime ISR skills and experiences may not be uniform across 
manned and unmanned missions. Indeed, we may find one set of personnel (e.g., 
planners, controllers, watch standers) that is proficient principally in terms of manned 
missions, whereas a different cadre of personnel becomes proficient principally in terms 
of unmanned missions. Given our current maritime ISR organization and approach, this 
will limit the degree of flexibility available in terms of assigning suitably experienced 
personnel to different jobs, and many organizations will need to staff themselves with 
seemingly redundant personnel: some possessing skill and experience with manned 
operations and others possessing similar yet distinct skill and experience with their 
unmanned counterparts. Results reveal that as task interdependence continues its shift 
toward integrated manned-unmanned missions, such similar yet distinct skill and 
experience will likely break down and become ineffective for maritime ISR. 
Alternatively, as noted below, other approaches to organizing and conducting maritime 
ISR offer potential to mitigate these detrimental effects. 
Results reveal further that maritime ISR organizations will make more mistakes; 
experience increasing time pressure; require greater effort, more time and higher cost to 
conduct missions; and operate under conditions of substantially higher mission risk. 
Moreover, if our maritime ISR organization and approach appear fragile with aircraft 
operating reciprocally (or integrally) only in pairs today, then one can imagine easily how 
such organization and approach could break under the load of tens or even hundreds (or 
possibly thousands) of aircraft operating simultaneously and reciprocally (or integrally). 
Imagine further the exacerbation stemming from a shift to strike and other missions that 
diverge from the ISR context of this study.  
Organizations will need to learn how to learn more quickly, and the current 
approach to education and training will likely fail. Other, more advanced approaches to 
accelerating knowledge flows through organizations will likely become mandatory—so 
that people, teams and organizations can learn more quickly and with fewer mistakes—
and people will need ways to learn just in time (JIT), knowing what to do and how to do 
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it well in the local context (e.g., when and where such knowledge is needed). Our extant 
military organization and approach appear to be unprepared to meet these organization 
learning demands. 
We do not have all of the answers in the present study, but organization (re)design 
lies at the center—particularly to promote rapid organization learning and to accelerate 
knowledge flows—and we may experience the compelling need to shift away from our 
familiar, hierarchical, archetypical organization and toward higher maturity, agile, edge-
like archetypes (e.g., Collaborative; see Alberts & Nissen, 2009).  
Moreover, this elucidates an organization challenge for DMO in general and the 
CTG in particular: mission efficacy may require shifting from one maritime ISR 
approach and organization to another depending upon the context; that is, the same CTG 
(or other organization) may need to employ different approaches and organizations across 
the range of diverse DMO contexts, even within the same ISR mission set. Some nominal 
mission (e.g., “Mission-1”) may be approached best by the traditional hierarchy, for 
instance, but then the next nominal mission (e.g., “Mission-2”) may require Self-
Synchronization or other, different organization and approach. This will require not only 
understanding which organization and approach is most appropriate for each particular 
mission, but also knowing how to transition from one organization and approach to 
another. As such we’re defining the state of the art with our research, and such 
organization selection and transition is way beyond current practice. 
We need to understand more about future AS, and we need to examine both 
current and future, manned and unmanned, aircraft missions through alternate DMO 
organizations and approaches (e.g., Hierarchy, Collaborative, Self-Synchronization). This 
represents the research trajectory on which this present study falls, and we welcome other 
researchers, leaders and policy makers to join our effort to develop good answers and to 
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VII. APPENDIX A 
In this appendix we include detailed model specifications for reference. Details 
pertain in sequence to A) aircraft performance characteristics, B) model task 
specifications, C) model staffing specifications, D) baseline model parameters, and E) 
model manipulations. These model specifications serve as something of a Rosetta Stone: 
they translate the physical and operational aspects of ISR aircraft missions conducted by 
military organizations into parameters and values needed to drive POWer computational 
modeling and experimentation. In many cases, physical and operational variables and 
values can be input directly into POWer (e.g., aircraft cost per flight hour), but in other 
cases, characteristics that are observable in the physical world (e.g., relative skill of 
unmanned aircraft controllers with respect to manned aircraft pilots) must be matched 
with one or more corresponding POWer parameters (e.g., Aviation Skill) and set at 
appropriate levels (e.g., Medium for manned missions, Low for unmanned missions). 
Where POWer parameter levels have been established generally across many 
models, we stay with such levels unless driven in a compelling way otherwise; most 
POWer parameter settings at Medium, for instance, reflect this approach. This enables us 
to benefit from the many empirical validation projects that POWer and its predecessors 
have undergone, and it gives us considerable confidence that the organization structures 
and behaviors modeled here represent faithfully those of their corresponding real-world 
organizations operating in the field. 
There is ample room for discussion and argument regarding the precise values 
used for modeling. Nonetheless, where the same values are held constant across 
computational models and corresponding simulation runs, the exact level specified for 
each parameter becomes somewhat irrelevant: the relative performance across 
experiment conditions is of greatest interest in this study. We welcome other researchers 
to specify and run the models using alternate parameter settings, as sensitivity analysis 
along such lines will help to build confidence in the models. 
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A. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Performance characteristics of the seven aircraft types are summarized in Table 7. 
Briefly, endurance represents the flight time (in hours) expected for each aircraft type. 
For instance, we list the F/A-18 at 1.5 hours; this value is not exact but should be about 
the right level in comparison with the other aircraft types. Crew represents the number of 
flight personnel onboard (manned) or involved with operating (unmanned) aircraft. For 
instance, we show the Navy F/A-18 with its single pilot; this value should be appropriate 
for most ISR missions. CFH represents the rough cost per flight hour ($k) associated with 
each aircraft. For instance, the F/A-18 CFH is listed at $10k; this value is approximate. 
Sorties represents the number of sorties required for each aircraft type to perform a 
nominal 24 hour ISR mission. For instance, we list the F/A-18 at 16 sorties; this value is 
simply the number of nominal mission hours (24 hours) divided by aircraft endurance 
(1.5 hours). Finally, CPH represents cost per head ($k) and reflects a value input into the 
computational model for each flight crew member; it is subject to the same limitations as 
noted for CFH above, considering, for instance, several of the other performance 
characteristics listed here. 
Table 7 Aircraft Performance Characteristics 
Type Endurance Crew CFH ($k) Sorties CPH ($k) 
F/A-18 1.5 hrs 1 10.0 16 15.0 
MH-60 4.0 hrs 3 4.0 6 5.3 
FireScout 4.0 hrs 3 3.0 6 4.0 
ScanEagle 24.0 hrs 1 0.5 1 12.0 
Triton 24.0 hrs 3 1.5 1 12.0 
L4 24.0 hrs 1 0.5 1 12.0 
L5 24.0 hrs 1 0.5 1 12.0 
 
Values for the F/A-18 and MH-60 reflect relatively well-known performance 
data. We have less confidence in values for the FireScout, which has not been in service 
for very long. The same applies to the Triton, the values for which come principally from 
limited Global Hawk experience. ScanEagle estimates are our own and intended only to 
reflect the right order of magnitude. The L4 and L5 (i.e., Degree 4 and 5) UAV values 
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simply mirror those estimated for the ScanEagle. Cost values are included only for very 
rough comparison across experiment conditions, and absolute values should not be 
considered official or used for decision making. 
 
B. MODEL TASK SPECIFICATIONS 
Task specifications refer to POWer model parameter settings related to the tasks 
that actors perform within the organization. The parameter names and settings are 
technical, specific to the POWer computational environment, and probably not interesting 
to non-modelers. We include them here nonetheless for completeness and for reference. 
These parameter settings pertain to the baseline (pooled) level of interdependence and 
remain constant across all experiment manipulations. We list them in Table 8. 
Table 8 Baseline Model Task Specifications 
Task Type Effort Skill Rcmplx Scmplx Uncert Rework 
CTFs Duration 150d Generic Medium Medium Medium 0.30 
CTGs Duration 150d Generic Medium Medium Medium 0.30 
CVWs Duration 120d Air Medium Medium Medium 0.10 
DDGs Duration 120d Air Medium Medium Medium 0.10 
LCSs Duration 120d Air Medium Medium Medium 0.10 
TO Duration 10d Air Low Low Low 0.10 
Nav Duration 30d Air Low Low Low 0.10 
Op Duration 120d Air Medium Medium Medium 0.10 
RTB Duration 30d Air Low Low Low 0.10 
Land Duration 10d Air Low Low Low 0.10 
 
The first five tasks represent operational leadership, decision making and staff 
work in addition to common tasks (e.g., planning, maintenance, air traffic control) at 
various levels of the organization. The first two rows reflect such tasks at the CTF and 
CTG levels, respectively, with the next three reflecting like tasks for the carrier air wing 
(CVW), destroyer (DDG) and littoral combat ship (LCS) organizations. These include the 
kinds of planning, organizing, decision making, commanding, controlling, maintenance 
and like tasks conducted onboard various ships underway at sea. 
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Type represents a POWer parameter for the kind of work involved; here we 
specify Duration (in model days34), with Effort reflecting the model parameter level input 
for each task. All actors have Generic skill, which corresponds to Skill required for the 
first two tasks. Most other tasks in this table require Air skill (e.g., aviation knowledge) 
also. Rcmplx and Scmplx represent requirements complexity and solution complexity, 
respectively, of the tasks; parameter values range from Low to High, with settings at 
Medium35 unless compelling reasons suggest otherwise. Uncert represents the 
uncertainty level; the same comment applies pertaining to settings at Medium. Finally, 
Rework reflects the strength of rework links emanating from the tasks; this represents 
roughly the amount (expressed as a fraction of the original work affected) of effort 
required to handle exceptions and correct mistakes. 
The remaining tasks represent operations flight work performed by aircrew 
members, and they follow the natural sortie process: take off or launch (TO), navigate to 
the operating area (Nav), conduct ISR on site (Op), return to the ship (RTB), and land or 
recover (Land). Their durations are set nominally to represent approximately 20 hours. 
All of these aircrew tasks require Air skill, reflect High priority, and are set with 0.10 
rework strength. With the exception of Operate, they all reflect Low complexity and 
uncertainty; the Medium levels set for Operate adjust for the relative difficulties 
associated with finding, following, sensing and analyzing ISR targets once on station. 
 
C. MODEL STAFFING SPECIFICATIONS 
Staffing specifications refer to POWer model parameter settings related to the 
organization actors that perform tasks. The parameter names and settings are technical, 
specific to the POWer computational environment, and probably not interesting to non-
modelers. We include them here nonetheless for completeness and for reference. These 
 
34 POWer is designed to represent organization behavior and performance over relatively long periods of 
time. Because our simulated ISR mission is specified at a nominal 24 hours, we manipulate the POWer 
model to preserve its fidelity on such relatively short duration. To translate the model’s pure output values 
into mission performance levels, one can simply divide mission time by 10. Thus, an input duration of 150 
days would represent approximately 15 hours’ mission time, during which the corresponding actors would 
be engaged actively. Hence these values include time for rest, meals, shift and watch changes, equipment 
maintenance and downtime, and like factors associated with everyday work. 
35 Most ordinal parameters are set nominally at Medium throughout POWer. This establishes and maintains 
a stable baseline for comparison across various models and runs. 
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parameter settings pertain to the baseline (pooled) level of interdependence. Some of 
them vary across experiment conditions as summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9 Baseline Model Staff Specifications 
Position Level Role AXp CXp FTE Sal Skill 
CTF 4 PM Medium Medium 1 0 G(M) 
CTG 3 PM Medium Medium 1 0 G(M) 
CVW 2 PM Medium Medium 1 0 A(M) 
DDG 2 PM Medium Medium 1 0 A(M) 
LCS 2 PM Medium Medium 1 0 A(M) 
F/A-18 1 SL High High 16 15.0 A(M) 
MH-60 1 SL High High 18 5.3 A(M) 
ScanEagle 1 SL High Medium 1 12.0 A(L) 
FireScout 1 SL High Medium 18 4.0 A(L) 
Triton 1 SL High Medium 3 12.0 A(L) 
L4 1 SL High High 1 12.0 A(M) 
L5 1 SL High High 1 12.0 A(H) 
 
 The first five positions represent leadership roles, associated command staffs and 
common tasks performed at various levels of the organization. The first two rows pertain 
to the CTF and CTG organizations, respectively, with the next three pertaining to the 
carrier air wing (CVW), destroyer (DDG) and littoral combat ship (LCS) organizations. 
These include tasks like planning, organizing, decision making, commanding, 
controlling, maintenance and like tasks conducted onboard various ships underway at sea. 
 Level refers to the organization level represented in our model; because we focus 
on DMO in this model, we include the three highest operational levels36 of command and 
staff work (i.e., CTF at Level 4; CTG at Level 3; and CVW, DDG and LCS at Level 2) 
along with a single level of operations work (i.e., pertaining to each of the various 
manned and unmanned aircraft flown: F/A-18, MH-60, ScanEagle, FireScout, Triton, and 
L4 & L5 advanced UAVs). These positions correspond to the command/staff and 
operations tasks summarized above; that is, the CTF position (e.g., commander and staff) 
 
36 Clearly there are very many rank levels spanning the range from lowest level Seaman (e.g., E3) to JTF 
Commander (e.g., O9). Abstracting away details that are unnecessary for our examination of TASP C2, 
however, we find that three levels of command and staff (i.e., Levels 2 – 4) and a single level of operations 
(i.e., Level 1) roles are sufficient. 
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performs the CTF tasks, the CTG37 position (e.g., commander and staff) performs the 
CTG tasks, and so forth. 
 Role refers to a POWer parameter that characterizes the kind of organization work 
performed generally (i.e., PM = Project Manager; SL = Subteam Leader; ST = Subteam); 
this parameter impacts model behaviors such as attention to handling exceptions, 
correcting mistakes and attending to communications. AXp refers to the parameter 
application experience, which reflects how much experience with this or similar kinds of 
work (e.g., joint task force missions) actors within each role possess. Most roles are 
specified at Medium unless there is a compelling reason to adjust the parameter setting 
upward (i.e., High) or downward (i.e., Low). In the case of these command and staff 
positions, many commanders and staffs rotate between various jobs frequently (e.g., 
every two to three years), whereas most aircraft operators (esp. manned aircraft pilots) fly 
the same planes throughout their aviation careers; we apply the same reasoning to 
unmanned aircraft operators.  
The parameter CXp refers to culture experience and is specified similarly (e.g., 
Low/Medium/High, baseline at Medium). We specify this parameter at High for the 
manned aircraft positions, because they tend to work within a relatively homogeneous 
organization culture throughout most of their careers. Alternatively, because UAVs 
remain a comparatively nascent and still emerging organization phenomenon, we do not 
give the corresponding positions the same credit in terms of culture experience.  
FTE refers to full time equivalent, which does not equate to headcount within the 
command/staff organization but does capture aircrew size. It is a POWer parameter that 
we combine with sorties, CFH and other variables to compare ISR operations costs. Sal, 
for instance, refers to the cost per FTE and incorporates the number of sorties required for 
a nominal 24 hour ISR mission as discussed above.  
Finally, Skill represents the kind and level of skill possessed by actors in each 
position, with Generic (G) and Air (A) matching the skills required by various tasks as 
 
37 The designator CTG obscures the likelihood that a CTF has more than a single CTG in the organization. 
We label and specify them numerically (i.e., “CTG-1,” “CTG-2,” “CTG-3,” … “CTG-n”) in the model, but 
we show only the generic “CTG” in this table. The same applies to carrier air wings (e.g., CVW-1 – n), 
destroyers (e.g., DDG-1 – n), littoral combat ships (e.g., LCS-1 – n) and other command/staff 
organizations, as well as operators of the various manned and unmanned aircraft (e.g., F/A-18-1 – n, MH-
60-1 – n, ScanEagle-1 – n). 
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noted above. For instance, the CVW position possesses the Air skill (A), and the CVW 
task requires that same Air skill (A), thereby representing a good role-task match and 
generating competent job performance through the model. All of the command/staff and 
manned aircraft operator roles are specified with skill levels at Medium, reflecting 
demonstrably competent performance capabilities, whereas current unmanned aircraft 
operators (i.e., ScanEagle, FireScout, Triton) are specified with Low skill levels, 
reflecting continued development required to match the proficiency of manned aircraft 
operators. Alternatively, the future capability unmanned aircraft operators are specified at 
Medium (i.e., L4) and High (i.e., L5) skill, parameterizing our model assumption that 
future UAVs may be able to match (L4) and even exceed (L5) the capability and 
performance of their manned aircraft counterparts. This assumption is clearly subject to 
disagreement, and other modelers are encouraged to substitute alternate assumptions to 
conduct sensitivity analysis through the model. 
 
D. BASELINE MODEL PARAMETERS 
POWer model parameters serve to further specify the DMO model. The parameter 
names and settings are technical, specific to the POWer computational environment, and 
probably not interesting to non-modelers. We include them here nonetheless for 
completeness and for reference. These parameter settings pertain to the baseline (pooled) 
level of interdependence. Some of them vary across experiment conditions as 
summarized in Table 10. 
Team Experience refers to the amount of time members of work teams have spent 
performing as a team together; frequent personnel rotation suggests that Medium is 
appropriate for this parameter setting. Centralization refers to the degree to which 
information flows to and decisions are made by senior leaders; although the Military is 
highly centralized generally in this regard, particularly in terms of C2, the nature of 
manned and unmanned ISR missions suggests alternately that much information and 
many decisions remain with aircraft operators. The same logic applies for Formalization, 
which refers to the formality of work, jobs and communications: highly formal for 
command/staff organizations but comparatively less formal among aircraft operators 
while on ISR missions. Matrix Strength refers to the degree to which people 
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communicate with peers (High) or attend formal meetings (Low) as a principal source of 
situational knowledge; as with centralization and formalization, the Medium setting 
strikes a balance within this DMO organization model38. Each of these model parameters 
ranges from Low to High. 
Table 10 Baseline Model Parameters 
Parameter BL Setting 
Team Experience (Low – High) Medium 
Centralization (Low – High) Medium 
Formalization (Low – High) Medium 
Matrix Strength (Low – High) Medium 
Communication Prob (0.20 – 0.90) 0.20 
Noise Prob (0.01 – 0.20) 0.05 
Functional Exception Prob (0.05 – 0.10) 0.08 
Mission Exception Prob (0.05 – 0.20) 0.10 
Mission Priority (Low – High) Medium 
Work Day (s) 480 
Work Week (s) 2400 
 
Communication Prob refers to the likelihood that any particular task in the model 
will require communication with another one; this parameter centers on (green) 
communication links that appear only with reciprocal and integrated levels of 
interdependence, with probabilities in the range listed. Noise Prob refers to the likelihood 
that an actor performing a model task will encounter some kind of distraction; 
interruptions from telephones, radios, unexpected visitors, unplanned task assignments 
and like distractions are all modeled through this parameter, with probabilities in the 
range listed.  
Functional Exception Prob refers to the likelihood that a model task will incur an 
exception or experience an error or mistake of some kind; relatively routine and well-
practiced tasks have lower likelihood than their comparatively novel and less-performed 
 
38 As a note, we could build one model for the command/staff part of the organization and another for the 
operator part, and we would likely specify each such model differently along the lines of these parameters 
(e.g., centralization, formalization, matrix strength), but it would become more difficult to model the 
interactions between them, which is central to our interest in understanding TASP C2 better. 
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counterparts, with probabilities in the range listed. Mission Exception Prob is similar but 
applies at the mission or project as opposed to the task level; the ISR mission is the 
project in our model, with probabilities in the range listed. Mission Priority refers to the 
relative importance of the mission or project when compared to the range experienced by 
the modeled organization; conducting or defending against an attack, for instance, would 
generate High priority very clearly, whereas getting food on the table would generate 
Low priority. Finally, the parameters Work Day and Work Week define the length of a 
typical “day” and “week” within the model, with each measured in seconds (s). The 
model settings listed in the table reflect ample time for breaks, watch changes, 
maintenance, repairs, meals and other downtime. They also conform to our comment 
above regarding how “days” within the POWer model correspond to the nominal 24 hour 
project length specified for our ISR mission. 
 
E. MODEL MANIPULATIONS 
Model manipulations refer to POWer model parameter settings that serve as 
experiment manipulations, and hence are varied deliberately and systematically across 
the diverse computational models and simulation runs. The parameter names and settings 
are technical, specific to the POWer computational environment, and probably not 
interesting to non-modelers. We include them here nonetheless for completeness and for 
reference. They are summarized in Table 11. Parameter settings under the “Pooled” 
column correspond with those listed above and elsewhere as “baseline” values in the 
model. 
Table 11 Model Manipulations 
Parameter Pooled Reciprocal Integrated 
Team Experience Medium Medium Low 
Centralization Medium Low Low 
Formalization Medium Low Low 
Matrix Strength Medium High High 
Comm Prob 0.20 0.50 0.90 
Noise Prob 0.05 0.05 0.20 
Operator Role SL SL ST 
Operator AXp High Medium Low 
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 Team Experience is discussed above and set at Medium for the baseline (pooled) 
POWer model. This Medium setting applies to the reciprocal level of interdependence 
also, but it becomes Low at the integrated level; this reflects the lack of experience that 
human and machine aircrews have in terms of flying together. Centralization, 
Formalization and Matrix Strength are discussed similarly above and set likewise at 
Medium for the baseline (pooled) POWer model. Each of these parameter settings 
changes (i.e., to Low, Low, High) for both the reciprocal and integrated models, however, 
as many more decisions and communications are made locally (esp. between aircraft 
flying together). 
 Communication Prob changes substantially across interdependence levels, 
ranging from 0.20 in the pooled condition, through 0.50 in reciprocal, to 0.90 in 
integrated. For reciprocal interdependence, this represents the considerable increase in 
communication between aircrews flying missions together in common airspace. 
Additionally for integrated interdependence, manned and unmanned aircrews are flying 
missions together in common airspace, and considerably more communication is required 
(esp. between manned and unmanned aircrews). Noise Prob is the same across pooled 
and reciprocal levels of interdependence, for manned aircraft fly only with their manned 
counterparts, and unmanned fly likewise only with unmanned. The additional distractions 
and interruptions stemming from integrated manned-unmanned missions account for the 
increased Noise. 
 Finally, two parameters associated with (both command/staff and) aircrew staff 
specifications are manipulated across interdependence levels also. The first pertains to the 
role. As noted in the baseline staff specifications above, the command/staff roles (e.g., 
CTF, CTG, CVW) are all set at PM, and the aircraft operator roles (e.g., F/A-18, 
FireScout, L5) are all set at SL. These same settings apply to reciprocal interdependence 
as well. In the integrated case, however, the roles change to SL for command/staff and ST 
for aircrew; this represents the very different organization environment exhibiting 
integrated manned-unmanned aircraft missions. Likewise with AXp, there is likely to be 
some additional application experience required for ISR missions involving reciprocal 
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interdependence, even more so with the integrated interdependence corresponding to 
manned-unmanned missions. 
 
F. MODEL MEASURES 
Model measures refer to POWer dependent variables employed to gauge, assess 
and compare DMO behavior and performance across experiment conditions. Among 
many POWer parameters that can be used as dependent variables, we focus in particular 
on eight model measures appropriate for our context. These measures are summarized in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 Model Measures 
Measure Description 
Duration (hours) Total clock or calendar time required to complete a mission 
Rework (person-hours) Amount of effort expended correcting mistakes 
Coordination (person-hours) Amount of effort expended on coordinating mission activities 
Wait (person-hours) Amount of effort expended while awaiting information or direction 
Work Cost ($k) Direct cost of effort expended on mission tasks 
Functional Risk (%) Fraction of effort required to address residual functional mistakes 
Mission Risk (%) Fraction of effort required to address residual mission mistakes 
Maximum Backlog (hours) Amount of effort required to address tasks ready for accomplishment 
 
Briefly, duration represents the total clock or calendar time required to complete a 
mission successfully. It is measured from the time that a mission begins until it is 
completed successfully. In the case of the nominal 24 hour ISR mission specified for this 
study, one would anticipate most missions to require approximately 24 hours to complete, 
hence most missions would be expected to have duration of roughly 24 hours. Not all 
missions go exactly as planned, however, and myriad different impacts—from random 
variation and events, through unplanned mistakes and delays, to inefficient organization, 
command and control—can either accelerate or decelerate mission performance. Faster 
mission performance is preferred generally to slower. Duration is measured in hours of 
elapsed time. 
Rework represents the amount of effort expended to correct mistakes that are 
committed during mission performance. Such mistakes can be made functionally (i.e., 
within one or more functional departments or like organizations participating in mission 
performance) or integrationally (i.e., across multiple functional departments or like 
organizations participating in mission performance). Lesser rework is preferred often to 
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greater, but if mistakes are not corrected by reworking errant mission tasks, then the risk 
of both functional and mission failure rises. Rework is measured in person-hours; that is, 
the number of people involved with rework activities multiplied by the number of hours 
each expends on such activities. For instance, 1 person working for 100 hours would 
represent 100 person-hours, as would 100 people working for 1 hour, 10 people working 
for 10 hours, and so forth. 
Coordination represents the amount of effort expended to coordinate mission 
activities. Meetings, memos, conversations, radio interactions and like communication 
modes all contribute to the coordination load of a C2 organization, as do planning and 
control activities. Lesser coordination is preferred often to greater, but if people do not 
know what to do or how, when, where and with whom to do it, then mission performance 
may accumulate a greater number of mistakes, take longer to complete, and be less 
effective generally. Coordination is measured in person-hours. 
Wait represents the amount of effort expended while awaiting information or 
direction. It reflects time that people are “working on the clock” but not performing 
productively or contributing positively toward mission accomplishment. Idle time is a 
term that captures the essence of wait: some people in the organization are unproductive 
for periods of time while waiting for others to provide important information or to make 
important decisions that are necessary for them to proceed with their assigned work tasks. 
Lesser wait time is preferred almost always to greater. Wait is measured in person-hours. 
Work Cost represents the direct cost of effort expended on mission tasks. It is 
calculated roughly as the number of hours worked directly on a mission (e.g., excluding 
rework, coordination and wait effort) times the hourly cost of each actor in the 
organization. It is important to note that this represents a POWer model measure that is 
understood best in terms of comparison across experiment conditions, not as absolute 
values. For instance, work cost excludes cost for rework, coordination and wait efforts, 
the latter of which are certainly included in the costs of operating organizations in the 
field, and relative costs across different aircraft types are more informative than absolute 
costs. Work cost is measured in thousands of (US) dollars ($k). 
Functional Risk represents the fraction of effort that would be required to address 
residual functional mistakes. The more functional mistakes (i.e., within one or more 
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functional departments or like organizations participating in mission performance) that 
are made—and not reworked satisfactorily—during mission performance, the higher the 
risk of mission failure becomes. Lesser functional risk is preferred generally to greater, 
but many organizations are required to trade off some performance measures versus 
others. For instance, performance measured in terms of duration may require a tradeoff 
against functional risk, hence a decision maker may elect to accept greater risk to achieve 
faster mission performance. Functional risk is measured as a percentage of total work 
cost. 
Mission Risk represents the fraction of effort that would be required to address 
residual mission mistakes. The more integrational mistakes (i.e., across multiple 
functional departments or like organizations participating in mission performance) that 
are made—and not reworked satisfactorily—during mission performance, the higher the 
risk of mission failure becomes. Lesser mission risk is preferred generally to greater, but 
many organizations are required to trade off some performance measures versus others. 
For instance, performance measured in terms of duration may require a tradeoff against 
mission risk, hence a decision maker may elect to accept greater risk to achieve faster 
mission performance. Mission risk is measured as a percentage of total work cost. 
Maximum Backlog represents the amount of effort required to address tasks that 
are ready for accomplishment but have not yet been accomplished. The best metaphor for 
backlog is the in-basket on an actor’s desk. Such an in-basket holds the work that has 
arrived for that actor to complete but that has not yet been accomplished by the actor. 
Another way to think about backlog is via scheduled work: backlog is the amount of 
work that is scheduled for accomplishment but that has not yet been completed. Backlog 
varies—for every actor in an organization—throughout mission performance. Some 
actors accumulate backlogs early during mission performance, whereas others 
accumulate them in the latter parts, and still others maintain steady backlogs. Maximum 
backlog is a measure of any individual actor’s backlog at its highest level during mission 
performance. Lesser backlog is preferred generally to greater, but an actor with nothing 
in its in-basket has nothing productive to do, so some backlog is desirable. Maximum 
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VIII. APPENDIX B 
In this appendix we include detailed model results for reference. Details pertain in 
sequence to A) numeric results and B) graphic results.  
 
A. NUMERIC RESULTS  
We begin by summarizing numeric results from the computational experiments. 
Results in terms of each of the model measures are summarized in turn.  
 
1. Duration 
Table 13 summarizes results for duration. The first column of the table is labeled 
“Level” and refers to autonomy degree. “D0” in the first row, for instance, corresponds to 
autonomy degree 0 (i.e., manned aircraft). All autonomy levels 0 – 5 are included. The 
second column of the table is labeled “Ship” and refers to the ship platform that the 
manned and/or unmanned aircraft operate from. The three ship platforms (i.e., CVN, 
DDG, LCS) are all shown on separate rows—corresponding to separate POWer 
models—within the D0 section, for instance. The third column of the table is labeled 
“Aircraft” and refers to the aircraft flown to perform the ISR mission. Two aircraft are 
involved with every mission within this study, and each is designated by a two-digit 
label. “1818” corresponds to a mission conducted by two F/A-18 aircraft, for instance, 
with “6060” corresponding to a mission conducted by two MH-60 aircraft This same 
labeling continues down the table through all six autonomy degrees. 
 103 
Table 13 Simulation Results – Duration 
Duration (hrs x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 302 333 456
CVN 6060 302 333 455
DDG 6060 302 331 454
LCS 6060 304 333 456
D1 DDG SESE 342 446 624
DDG 60SE 696
LCDD 60SE 699
D2 LCS FSFS 342 447 620
LCS 60FS 614
DDLC 60FS 613
D3 CTF TRTR 341 446 622
CVCT 18TR 639
D4 CVN L4L4 303 333 460
CVN 60L4 544
DDCV 60L4 537
D5 CVN L5L5 301 300 329
CVN 18L5 449
CVDD 18L5 451  
 
The fourth column of the table is labeled “Pool” and refers to duration measured 
(hours x 10) under the pooled interdependence experiment condition. For instance in the 
first row (i.e., D0 CVN 1818), the result shown is 302, which is 30.2 hours; that is, the 
ISR mission required just over 30 hours to complete in this experiment condition (i.e., 
conducted by two F/A-18s operated in separate airspace from the CVN). The other three 
D0 results (i.e., D0 CVN 6060, D0 DDG 6060, D0 LCS 6060) are very close39 in terms 
of mission duration (i.e., 302, 302, 304, respectively).  
The fifth column in the table is labeled “Recip” and refers to duration measured 
(hours x 10) under the reciprocal interdependence experiment condition. For instance in 
the first row (i.e., D0 CVN 1818), the result shown is 333, which is 33.3 hours; that is, 
the ISR mission required just over 33 hours to complete in this experiment condition (i.e., 
conducted by two F/A-18s operated in separate airspace from the CVN). The other three 
 
39 There are myriad reasons why the same mission conducted by different aircraft operating from different 
ship platforms and controlled by different C2 organizations may reflect differing performance levels. 
Alternatively, where all things remain the same—ceteris paribus—one would expect the results to be very 
close if not exact. We discuss reasons for variation in the Results section. 
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D0 results (i.e., D0 CVN 6060, D0 DDG 6060, D0 LCS 6060) are very close in terms of 
mission duration (i.e., 333, 331, 333, respectively).  
The sixth column in the table is labeled “Integ” and refers to duration measured 
(hours x 10) under the integrated interdependence experiment condition40. For instance in 
the first row (i.e., D0 CVN 1818), the result shown is 456, which is 45.6 hours; that is, 
the ISR mission required over 45 hours to complete in this experiment condition (i.e., 
conducted by two F/A-18s operated in separate airspace from the CVN). The other three 
D0 results (i.e., D0 CVN 6060, D0 DDG 6060, D0 LCS 6060) are very close in terms of 
mission duration (i.e., 455, 454, 456, respectively). 
The same scheme follows for the other autonomy levels. In the autonomy degree 
1 (“D1”) section (see Column 1), for instance, we find three entries—corresponding to 
three different models—with the corresponding ship platforms (e.g., “DDG”) and aircraft 
(e.g., “SESE”) listed. Using our labeling system discussed above, “DDG” refers to one or 
more destroyers (DDGs) serving as the ship platform for the ISR mission conducted by 
both aircraft, and “LCDD” refers to one or more Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and 
destroyers serving together as ship platforms for the ISR mission conducted by the two 
aircraft. Likewise, “SESE” signifies that two ScanEagles are involved, and “60SE” 
signifies that one MH-60 and one ScanEagle are involved. This pattern and scheme 
continue through all autonomy degrees. 
 
2. Rework 
Table 14 summarizes results for rework. The layout of the table is identical to the 
one above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 566, 549 and 400 
(person-hours x 10), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated 
interdependence conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission required 56.6 person-
hours of rework in the pooled condition, 54.9 person-hours in the reciprocal condition, 
and 40.0 person-hours in the integrated condition. 
 
40 Speaking technically, integrated interdependence does not apply to missions flown solely by two manned 
or two unmanned aircraft; that is, integrated interdependence applies only to missions flown by both 
manned and unmanned aircraft. Nonetheless, several model parameter settings differ between reciprocal 
and integrated interdependence experiment conditions, and it is informative to examine even all-manned or 
all-unmanned aircraft missions through both such conditions. 
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Table 14 Simulation Results – Rework 
Rework (p-hrs x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 566 549 400
CVN 6060 623 608 442
DDG 6060 632 596 437
LCS 6060 643 596 428
D1 DDG SESE 124 126 73
DDG 60SE 256
LCDD 60SE 258
D2 LCS FSFS 459 454 269
LCS 60FS 362
DDLC 60FS 347
D3 CTF TRTR 150 153 95
CVCT 18TR 238
D4 CVN L4L4 134 136 82
CVN 60L4 262
DDCV 60L4 258
D5 CVN L5L5 134 133 80
CVN 18L5 241
CVDD 18L5 258  
 
3. Coordination 
Table 15 summarizes results for coordination. The layout of the table is identical 
to those above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 132, 358 and 454 
(person-hours x 10), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated 
interdependence conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission required 13.2 person-
hours of coordination in the pooled condition, 35.8 person-hours in the reciprocal 
condition, and 45.4 person-hours in the integrated condition. 
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Table 15 Simulation Results – Coordination 
Coordination (p-hrs x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 132 358 454
CVN 6060 145 396 481
DDG 6060 148 396 480
LCS 6060 144 399 486
D1 DDG SESE 26 34 140
DDG 60SE 299
LCDD 60SE 305
D2 LCS FSFS 147 291 480
LCS 60FS 603
DDLC 60FS 651
D3 CTF TRTR 39 62 203
CVCT 18TR 343
D4 CVN L4L4 26 40 138
CVN 60L4 290
DDCV 60L4 295
D5 CVN L5L5 26 57 137
CVN 18L5 279




Table 16 summarizes results for wait. The layout of the table is identical to those 
above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 98, 37 and 149 (person-
hours x 10), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated interdependence 
conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission required 9.8 person-hours of wait in the 
pooled condition, 3.7 person-hours in the reciprocal condition, and 14.9 person-hours in 
the integrated condition. 
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Table 16 Simulation Results – Wait 
Wait (p-hrs x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 98 37 149
CVN 6060 122 46 147
DDG 6060 124 36 138
LCS 6060 124 38 156
D1 DDG SESE 3 1 3
DDG 60SE 98
LCDD 60SE 104
D2 LCS FSFS 96 41 162
LCS 60FS 146
DDLC 60FS 145
D3 CTF TRTR 12 5 16
CVCT 18TR 73
D4 CVN L4L4 3 1 3
CVN 60L4 105
DDCV 60L4 106
D5 CVN L5L5 3 1 2
CVN 18L5 72
CVDD 18L5 84  
 
 
5. Work Cost 
Table 17 summarizes results for work cost. The layout of the table is identical to 
those above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 591, 768 and 1097 
($k x 10), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated interdependence 
conditions. More specifically, work cost for the ISR mission was $59.1k in the pooled 
condition, $76.8k in the reciprocal condition, and $109.7k in the integrated condition. 
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Table 17 Simulation Results – Work Cost 
Work Cost ($k x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 591 768 1097
CVN 6060 236 307 439
DDG 6060 236 307 439
LCS 6060 236 307 439
D1 DDG SESE 42 55 78
DDG 60SE 259
LCDD 60SE 259
D2 LCS FSFS 253 324 470
LCS 60FS 455
DDLC 60FS 455
D3 CTF TRTR 127 165 235
CVCT 18TR 667
D4 CVN L4L4 30 38 55
CVN 60L4 247
DDCV 60L4 247
D5 CVN L5L5 20 26 37
CVN 18L5 567
CVDD 18L5 567  
 
 
6. Functional Risk 
Table 18 summarizes results for functional risk. The layout of the table is 
identical to those above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 0.40, 0.39 
and 0.40 (% / 100), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated 
interdependence conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission experienced 40% 





Table 18 Simulation Results – Functional Risk 
Functional Risk (% / 100)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 0.40 0.39 0.40
CVN 6060 0.41 0.40 0.39
DDG 6060 0.41 0.40 0.42
LCS 6060 0.39 0.40 0.42
D1 DDG SESE 0.52 0.51 0.52
DDG 60SE 0.43
LCDD 60SE 0.42
D2 LCS FSFS 0.73 0.74 0.74
LCS 60FS 0.56
DDLC 60FS 0.59
D3 CTF TRTR 0.62 0.62 0.61
CVCT 18TR 0.46
D4 CVN L4L4 0.40 0.39 0.40
CVN 60L4 0.40
DDCV 60L4 0.39
D5 CVN L5L5 0.36 0.36 0.36
CVN 18L5 0.40
CVDD 18L5 0.37  
 
 
7. Mission Risk 
Table 19 summarizes results for mission risk. The layout of the table is identical 
to those above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 0.37, 0.38 and 0.74 
(% / 100), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated interdependence 
conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission experienced 37% mission risk in the 
pooled condition, 38% in the reciprocal condition, and 74% in the integrated condition. 
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Table 19 Simulation Results – Mission Risk 
Mission Risk (% / 100)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 0.37 0.38 0.74
CVN 6060 0.39 0.37 0.74
DDG 6060 0.37 0.38 0.72
LCS 6060 0.37 0.38 0.75
D1 DDG SESE 0.27 0.27 0.53
DDG 60SE 0.75
LCDD 60SE 0.70
D2 LCS FSFS 0.37 0.36 0.74
LCS 60FS 0.74
DDLC 60FS 0.74
D3 CTF TRTR 0.32 0.32 0.60
CVCT 18TR 0.70
D4 CVN L4L4 0.26 0.27 0.54
CVN 60L4 0.73
DDCV 60L4 0.70
D5 CVN L5L5 0.28 0.26 0.54
CVN 18L5 0.72
CVDD 18L5 0.70  
 
 
8. Maximum Backlog 
Table 20 summarizes results for maximum backlog. The layout of the table is 
identical to those above. The values in the first row (i.e., “ D0 CVN 1818”) are 18, 17 
and 181 (hours x 10), respectively, for the pooled, reciprocal and integrated 
interdependence conditions. More specifically, the ISR mission experienced 1.8 hours 
maximum backlog in the pooled condition, 1.7 hours in the reciprocal condition, and 
18.1 hours in the integrated condition. 
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Table 20 Simulation Results – Maximum Backlog 
Backlog Max (hrs x 10)
Level Ship Aircraft Pool Recip Integ
D0 CVN 1818 18 17 181
CVN 6060 19 17 218
DDG 6060 19 17 215
LCS 6060 20 16 221
D1 DDG SESE 20 64 138
DDG 60SE 272
LCDD 60SE 274
D2 LCS FSFS 21 64 136
LCS 60FS 165
DDLC 60FS 139
D3 CTF TRTR 20 64 138
CVCT 18TR 167
D4 CVN L4L4 10 17 68
CVN 60L4 190
DDCV 60L4 195
D5 CVN L5L5 10 10 39
CVN 18L5 105
CVDD 18L5 104  
 
 
B. GRAPHIC RESULTS 
We continue by summarizing graphic results from the computational experiments. 
Results in terms of each of the model measures are summarized in turn.  
 
1. Duration 
Figure 37 summarizes duration results graphically. This is the same figure 
presented in the body of this report and is included here among details for reference. 
These graphic values match the numeric results presented in Table 13 above. The graph 
delineates duration (hours) for each experiment condition. The different experiment 
conditions are listed horizontally along the bottom of the graph, and vertical bars for each 
reflect its duration value. The three interdependence conditions are depicted in different 
colors shown by the key at the right side of the graph.  
For instance, the first experiment condition shown (far left) is labeled “1818,” 
reflecting two F/A-18 aircraft operated from a carrier. This corresponds to the row “D0 
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CVN 1818” in the table. The leftmost (blue) vertical bar represents the pooled 
interdependence result (30.2 hours), and the center (red) vertical bar represents the 
reciprocal interdependence result (33.3 hours). We omit a (green) vertical bar to represent 

























































Figure 37 Graphic Summary – Duration 
Likewise, the second experiment condition shown is labeled “6060,” reflecting 
two MH-60 aircraft operated from a carrier. This corresponds to the row “D0 CVN 6060” 
in the table. As above the leftmost (blue) vertical bar represents the pooled 
interdependence result (30.2 hours), the center (red) vertical bar represents the reciprocal 
interdependence result (33.3 hours), and we omit a (green) vertical bar to represent the 
integrated interdependence result (45.5 hours).  
This layout continues for the other two Autonomy 0 results, both labeled “6060” 
as well, which correspond, respectively, to the rows “D0 DDG 6060” (i.e., two MH-60 
aircraft operated from the DDG; 30.2 hours, 33.1 hours) and “D0 LCS 6060” (i.e., two 
MH-60 aircraft operated from the LCS; 30.4 hours, 33.3 hours) in the table. 
The pattern continues with Autonomy 1 results, labeled “SESE” in the figure, 
corresponding to the row “D1 DDG SESE” (i.e., two ScanEagle aircraft operated from 
the DDG; 34.2 hours, 44.6 hours) in the table. Likewise, the Autonomy 2 results, labeled 
“FSFS” in the figure, correspond to the row “D2 LCS FSFS” (i.e., two FireScout aircraft 
operated from the LCS; 34.2 hours, 44.7 hours). The Autonomy 3 results, labeled 
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“TRTR” in the figure, correspond to the row “D3 CTF TRTR” (i.e., two Triton aircraft 
under authority of the CTF; 34.1 hours, 44.6 hours).  
Continuing, the Autonomy 4 results, labeled “L4L4” in the figure, correspond to 
the row “D4 CVN L4L4” (i.e., two Level 4 UAV aircraft operated from the CVN; 30.3 
hours, 33.3 hours); and the Autonomy 5 results, labeled “L5L5” in the figure, correspond 
to the row “D5 CVN L5L5” (i.e., two Level 5 UAV aircraft operated from the CVN; 30.1 
hours, 30.0 hours) in the table. Notice that each of these Autonomy 1 – 5 experiment 
conditions includes two unmanned aircraft flying and does not include any instances of 
manned and unmanned aircraft performing the same missions. We include these for 
comparison on the left side of the graph with the corresponding pooled and reciprocal 
experiment conditions. 
Alternatively, the next set of results on the right side of the graph all pertain to 
integrated interdependence, and they all reflect results of manned and unmanned aircraft 
flying and conducting missions together. Notice, for instance, how only a single (green) 
vertical bar is used to represent each result. The first one of this set reflects autonomy 
degree 1, with an MH-60 and a ScanEagle operated from the DDG; it is labeled “60SE” 
in the figure and corresponds to the row “D1 DDG 60SE” (69.6 hours) in the table. The 
next one reflects autonomy degree 1 also, with an MH-60 and a ScanEagle as well, and it 
has the same “60SE” label in the figure, but it corresponds instead to the row “D1 LCDD 
60SE” (69.9 hours), as the MH-60 is operated from the LCS, and the ScanEagle is 
operated from the DDG. 
This pattern continues for two Autonomy 2 results, both labeled “60FS” in the 
figure, that correspond, respectively, to the rows “D2 LCS 60FS” (i.e., one MH-60 
operated from the LCS and one FireScout operated from the LCS; 61.4 hours) and “D2 
DDLC 60FS” (i.e., one MH-60 operated from the DDG and one FireScout operated from 
the LCS; 61.3 hours) in the table. One Autonomy 3 result, labeled “18TR” in the figure, 
appears among this set and corresponds to the row “D3 CVCT 18TR” (i.e., one F/A-18 
operated from the CVN and one Triton under authority of the CTF; 63.9 hours). This is 
followed by two Autonomy 4 results, both labeled “60L4” in the figure, corresponding, 
respectively, to the rows “D4 CVN 60L4” (i.e., one MH-60 operated from the CVN and 
one Level 4 UAV operated from the CVN; 54.4 hours) and “D4 DDCV 60L4” (i.e., one 
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MH-60 operated from the DDG and one Level 4 UAV operated from the CVN; 53.7 
hours). Finally, we see two Autonomy 5 results, both labeled “18L5” in the figure, 
corresponding, respectively, to the rows “D5 CVN 18L5” (i.e., one F/A-18 operated from 
the CVN and one Level 5 UAV operated from the CVN; 44.9 hours) and “D5 CVDD 
18L5” (i.e., one F/A-18 operated from the CVN and one Level 5 UAV operated from the 
DDG; 45.1 hours) in the table. 
Figure 38 provides a different perspective on the duration measure through a 
Radar chart depicting results for different ship platforms. Each radial line in the chart 
corresponds to a different ship platform, with distance from the center delineating 
increasing duration in hours. For instance, the radial line extending to the top of this 
figure is labeled “CVN 1818” and corresponds to the row “D0 CVN 1818” in the table. 
Each colored band corresponds with one of the three interdependence conditions. As in 
the charts above, blue is for pooled, and red is for reciprocal. In this first instance, one 
can see how each colored band extends outward along the (CVN 1818) radial to delineate 
the duration; that is, the blue band extends out to 30.2 hours duration for pooled 
























As another instance, moving clockwise around the figure, the next radial line is 
labeled “CVN 6060” and corresponds to the row “D0 CVN 6060” in the table. As above, 
each colored band corresponds with one of the three interdependence conditions: blue is 
for pooled (30.2 hours), and red is for reciprocal (33.3 hours). The other radial lines and 
duration values follow the same format. 
Figure 39 provides this same perspective to the integrated missions conducted 
together by manned and unmanned aircraft, and it follows this same format also. As with 
the corresponding charts above, only integrated interdependence missions are depicted in 





















Figure 40 summarizes rework results graphically. These graphic values (person-


























































Figure 40 Graphic Summary – Rework 
Figure 41 and Figure 42 provide a different perspective on the rework measure 
through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts follow 









































Figure 43 summarizes coordination results graphically. These graphic values 


























































Figure 43 Graphic Summary – Coordination 
Figure 44 and Figure 45 provide a different perspective on the coordination 
measure through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts 









































Figure 46 summarizes wait results graphically. These graphic values (person-



























































Figure 46 Graphic Summary – Wait 
Figure 47 and Figure 48 provide a different perspective on the wait measure 
through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts follow 


































Figure 48 Mixed Radar View – Wait 
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5. Work Cost 
Figure 49 summarizes work cost results graphically. These graphic values ($k) 























































Figure 49 Graphic Summary – Work Cost 
Figure 50 and Figure 51 provide a different perspective on the work cost measure 
through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts follow 




































Figure 51 Mixed Radar View – Work Cost 
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6. Functional Risk 
Figure 52 summarizes functional risk results graphically. These graphic values 





















































Figure 52 Graphic Summary – Functional Risk 
Figure 53 and Figure 54 provide a different perspective on the functional risk 
measure through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts 



































Figure 54 Mixed Radar View – Functional Risk 
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7. Mission Risk 
Figure 55 summarizes mission risk results graphically. These graphic values (%) 





















































Figure 55 Graphic Summary – Mission Risk 
Figure 56 and Figure 57 provide a different perspective on the mission risk 
measure through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts 









































8. Maximum Backlog 
Figure 58 summarizes maximum backlog results graphically. These graphic 























































Figure 58 Graphic Summary – Maximum Backlog 
Figure 59 and Figure 60 provide a different perspective on the maximum backlog 
measure through Radar charts depicting results for different ship platforms. These charts 
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